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Summary
This dissertation addresses the prediction of corporate earnings. The thesis aims
to examine whether the degree of precision in earnings forecasts can be increased
by basing them on historical ﬁnancial ratios. Furthermore, the intent of the disser-
tation is to analyze whether accounting standards affect the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts. Finally, the objective of the dissertation is to investigate how
the stock market is affected by the accuracy of corporate earnings projections.
The dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of these issues. First, it
is shown how earnings forecasts can be generated based on historical timeseries
patterns of ﬁnancial ratios. This is done by modeling the return on equity and the
growth-rate in equity as two separate but correlated timeseries processes which
converge to a long-term, constant level. Empirical results suggest that these earn-
ings forecasts are not more accurate than the simpler forecasts based on a histori-
cal timeseries of earnings. Secondly, the dissertation shows how accounting stan-
dards affect analysts’ earnings predictions. Accounting conservatism contributes
to a more volatile earnings process, which lowers the accuracy of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts. Furthermore, the dissertation shows how the stock market’s re-
action to the disclosure of information about corporate earnings depends on how
well corporate earnings can be predicted. The dissertation indicates that the stock
market’s reaction to the disclosure of earnings information is stronger for ﬁrms
whose earnings can be predicted with higher accuracy than it is for ﬁrms whose
earnings can not be predicted with the same degree of accuracy.
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Resume´ (Summary in Danish)
Denne afhandling omhandler forudsigelse af virksomheders indkomst. Afhan-
dlingen har til forma˚l at undersøge, hvorvidt graden af præcision i indkomst-
prognoser for virksomheder kan øges ved at basere indkomst-prognoser pa˚ his-
toriske, ﬁnansielle nøgletal. Ydermere, er hensigten med afhandlingen at analy-
sere hvorvidt regnskabsstandarder pa˚virker nøjagtigheden i analytikeres forudsig-
elser om virksomheders indkomst. Endelig, er ma˚let med afhandlingen at un-
dersøge, hvordan aktiemarkedet pa˚virkes af præcisionen i indkomst-prognoser
for virksomheder.
Afhandlingen bidrager til en dybere indsigt i disse problemstillinger. For det
første, vises hvordan indkomst-prognoser kan genereres udfra historiske tidsserie-
mønstre for ﬁnansielle nøgletal. Dette gøres ved at modellere egenkapitalsforrent-
ningen og vækstraten i egenkapitalen, som to seperate, men korrelerede tidsserie
processer, som konvergerer mod et langtsigtet, konstant niveau. Empiriske re-
sultater antyder, at disse indkomst prognoser ikke er mere nøjagtige end simplere
prognoser baseret pa˚ historiske tidsserier for indkomst. For det andet, viser afhan-
dlingen, hvordan regnskabsstandarder pa˚virker analytikeres indkomst forudsigel-
ser. Regnskabsmæssig konservatisme bidrager til en mere volatil indkomstproces,
hvilket sænker nøjagtigheden i analytikeres indkomst-prognoser. Desuden viser
afhandlingen, hvordan aktiemarkedets reaktion pa˚ offentliggørelse af information
om virksomheders indkomst, afhænger af i hvilken grad af præcision virksomhed-
ers indkomst kan predikteres. Afhandlingen indikerer, at aktiemarkedets reak-
tion pa˚ offentliggørelse af indkomst-information, er kraftigere for virksomheder
hvis indkomst kan forudsiges med højere nøjagtighed, sammenlignet med virk-
somheder hvis indkomst ikke kan forudsiges med samme grad af nøjagtighed.
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1 Research objective
For decades, the accounting literature (starting with Ball and Brown (1968) and
Beaver (1968)) has studied whether earnings announcements are relevant or in-
formative to investors, by looking at how prices (or market transactions) change
when earnings are announced. The informativeness of earnings announcements
is important for the stock market because it enhances the efﬁciency of capital al-
location across ﬁrms in society. The informativeness of earnings announcements
is closely related to the accuracy of earnings forecasting (which is also known
as earnings predictability). If earnings were perfectly predictable, earnings an-
nouncements should not create a stock price movement, because there would be
no earnings surprises (i.e. no new information content in the earnings). Likewise,
stock price movements should only emerge because of the time value of money
(i.e. less discounting of earnings)1. Earlier studies disagree about whether more
accurate earnings forecasting increases or decreases the informativeness of earn-
ings announcements.
Another branch of the literature has studied how accurate earnings forecasts are.
Lacina et al. (2011) and Bradshaw et al. (2012) compare analysts’ forecasts to
time-series based earnings forecasts. They ﬁnd that analyst forecasts are only
superior to a simple Random Walk (RW) time-series model in the short-run (i.e.
one or two years ahead). Bansal et al. (2012) and Ball et al. (2014) focus on how
the short-run accuracy of time-series based earnings forecasts can be enhanced.
In the same way as informativeness in earnings announcements is important for
the stock market, so are accurate earnings forecasts, because earnings forecasts
implicitly determine the capital allocation across ﬁrms. However, as far as my
1For this reason, increasing the accuracy of earnings forecasting should reduce the volatility of the stock market.
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knowledge extends, no studies have focused on enhancing the forecasting ac-
curacy of long-term (i.e. four or more years ahead), time-series-based earnings
forecasting.
Another way to enhance the accuracy of earnings forecasts is to change the def-
inition of earnings. Changing accounting standards is a way of redeﬁning the
deﬁnition of earnings. Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn
(2012) study how accounting standards (e.g. accounting conservatism) affects
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. These studies assume that earnings
volatility is exogenous. However, accounting conservatism probably changes the
time-series properties of earnings, which again will affect the accuracy of ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts. Thus, earnings volatility should be treated as an en-
dogenous variable.
The aim of this dissertation is to provide insight into how earnings predictability
(i.e. forecast accuracy) can be enhanced and how this affects the market’s reaction
to earnings announcements. More speciﬁcally, the aim is to develop time-series
based earnings forecasts that are more accurate than the existing time-series based
earnings forecasting models; to analyze how accounting standards affect earnings
predictability; and to analyze how earnings predictability moderates the relation
between unexpected earnings and unexpected returns (also known as the Earnings
Response Coefﬁcient).
Figure 1 depicts the relations between the articles in the dissertation.
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Figure 1: Article overview
The central concept of the dissertation, earnings predictability, is measured in
different ways in the literature. The most widely used measure is the standard
deviation of unexpected earnings, where unexpected earnings are deﬁned as the
forecast error (realized minus forecast value). For each ﬁrm, this measure can
be estimated both cross-sectionally (i.e. based on analysts’ forecasts)2 and based
on the time-series of earnings. The time-series properties of earnings (e.g. earn-
ings volatility and persistence) is very closely related to the time-series standard
deviation of unexpected earnings (Dichev and Tang (2009)). Thus, even though
2The standard deviation of unexpected earnings can also be estimated cross-sectionally based on time-series mod-
els. However this requires different time-series models, since a time-series model only generates a single forecast for
each ﬁrm at a given point in time.
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earnings volatility and persistence do not convey any information about forecast-
ing accuracy (since no forecasting is required to estimate the earnings volatility
and persistence), they can still be used as measures of earnings predictability.
In Article 1, I study whether the accuracy of time-series based earnings forecast
can be enhanced by incorporating a well-known empirical long-run time-series
property of earnings as well as well-known time-series properties of ﬁnancial ra-
tios: namely, the long-run growth in earnings and the mean-reversion in ﬁnancial
ratios. By modeling Return On Equity (ROE) and growth in book value of eq-
uity as two separate (but correlated) AR1 processes, I develop a time-series based
model that generates mean-reversion forecasts for these ﬁnancial ratios as well
as forecasts where earnings grow in the long-run. Since this model incorporates
well known empirical time-series properties, I hypothesize that its forecasting ac-
curacy is better than that of the Random Walk (which does not incorporate long-
run growth and mean-reversion of ﬁnancial ratios in forecasts) and the Random
Walk with drift (that does not incorporate mean-reversion of ﬁnancial ratios in
forecasts).
In Article 2, I study how accounting standards (e.g. accounting conservatism)
affects the time-series properties of earnings and how this change in time-series
properties affects the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using the Penman
and Zhang (2002) C-score (the estimated reserve) as a measure of accounting
conservatism, I study how conservatism affects the accuracy of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect is mediated through
earnings volatility, because accounting conservatism decreases the match between
revenue and expenses. This increases the volatility of earnings, which decreases
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (i.e. makes it more difﬁcult to forecast). Thus,
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in contrast to earlier research (Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and
Sohn (2012)) that treats earnings volatility as exogenous, I treat it as an endoge-
nous variable.
In Article 3, I study how earnings predictability moderates the relation between
unexpected earnings and unexpected returns (also known as the Earnings Re-
sponse Coefﬁcient (ERC)). I show how the most common empirical measures
of earnings predictability are related, and how earnings predictability moderates
the ERC without assuming a speciﬁc earnings expectation model, in contrast to
earlier research that assumes speciﬁc earnings expectation models. Furthermore,
using both a market based and two time-series based measures of earnings pre-
dictability, I estimate the relation between earnings predictability and the ERC.
2 Contributions
The three articles’ abstracts are replicated below.
Article 1: Using Time-series Properties of Financial Ratios to
Forecast Earnings
I forecast earnings from a model based on the time-series properties of ﬁnancial
ratios. This model captures two empirical patterns: mean reversion in ﬁnancial
ratios as well as long-run growth in earnings. I compare the accuracy of these
earnings forecasts with the forecasts from a Random Walk model and analysts’
forecasts based on a sample from 2001–2013. An analysis of the accuracy shows
that the earnings forecast from the ﬁnancial ratio based model are closer to having
an equal frequency of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts than are those from the
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Random Walk. However, in terms of forecasting accuracy and mean bias, the
Random Walk model is the superior model.
Article 2: Conservatism and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Accu-
racy
Based on US data, I study the total effect that accounting conservatism has on
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. I hypothesize that conservatism af-
fects this accuracy directly and indirectly via the effect that conservatism has on
the time-series properties of earnings. The results show that conservatism indi-
rectly and positively affects the absolute forecast errors and dispersion, because
conservatism increases earnings volatility. Furthermore, the results show that con-
servatism directly and positively inﬂuences the absolute forecast errors and dis-
persion, which indicates that either analysts do not correctly incorporate conser-
vatism into their forecasts or there are other factors (besides earnings volatility)
that mediate the relation between accounting conservatism and the accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The ﬁndings suggest that regulators should not only
consider the beneﬁts of accounting conservatism, namely, protecting investors
from future losses, but also the costs, in the form of higher earnings volatility and
lower accuracy of earnings forecasts.
Article 3: Earnings Predictability and the Earnings Response
Coefﬁcient
One way to measure the informativeness of accounting information is the rela-
tion between unexpected stock returns and unexpected earnings (the Earnings
Response Coefﬁcient (ERC)). This paper analyzes how earnings predictability
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affects the ERC. Earlier literature ﬁnds contradictory results about the relation
between earnings predictability and the ERC, which might be explained by the
earnings expectation model. I use three different measures of earnings predictabil-
ity (earnings persistence, earnings volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion) and
analytically show how they are related to each other and the ERC (without as-
suming a speciﬁc earnings expectation model). The analysis reveals that higher
earnings volatility is associated with a higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion
and lower earnings persistence. I provide evidence that a higher ERC is associated
with a higher earnings predictability.
3 Data and research methods
The data used in the articles are all from large databases: Compustat, I/B/E/S and
CRSP. The earnings forecasting accuracy (i.e. earnings predictability) measure in
Article 1 is based on the “Street” earnings deﬁnition in the I/B/E/S database. The
deﬁnition of “Street” earnings is a deﬁnition (used by ﬁnancial analysts) that gen-
erally excludes nonrecurring items (Gu and Chen (2004), Abarbanell and Lehavy
(2007)). I estimate the time-series model and study how earnings forecasting ac-
curacy differs across this model, the Random Walk model and analyst forecasts.
Estimation of the time-series properties on the individual ﬁrm-level implies small
estimation samples. Under the assumption that the estimates of the time-series
properties are consistent, increasing the sample size increases the probability of
the estimates’ being close to the true value. To increase the sample size, I estimate
the time-series properties of ﬁnancial ratios grouped by industry, based on panel
data. This, however, comes with a cost in terms of assuming that the time-series
properties of the ﬁnancial ratios are homogeneous across ﬁrms within an industry.
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In Article 2, information from Compustat is used to estimate the conservative
accounting factor (estimated reserve) as well as the earnings volatility and the
I/B/E/S database is used to calculate the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (i.e. earn-
ings predictability). The hypotheses in Article 2 were tested via path analysis
using the PROC CALIS procedure in SAS.
In Article 3, the Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) is estimated in the usual
way (the ERC is the parameter estimate from regressing unexpected earnings
on unexpected returns). The unexpected returns are estimated using stock re-
turns from CRSP and the market model. The unexpected earnings are estimated
from the I/B/E/S database as the difference between analysts’ earnings forecasts
and realized earnings. Estimating the earnings volatility and the earnings persis-
tence (i.e. measures of earnings predictability) requires longitudinal data. There-
fore I estimate the earnings volatility and earnings persistence based on earnings
from Compustat, since estimating the earnings volatility and persistence from the
I/B/E/S data would reduce the sample size signiﬁcantly. Even though the deﬁni-
tions of earnings in I/B/E/S and Compustat differ, these measure are very probably
highly correlated.
I test the hypotheses in Article 3 in the two step approach proposed by Cready
et al. (2001): ﬁrst I estimate individual ﬁrm ERCs; second, I regress the ERCs on
earnings predictability and the market-to-book ratio.
4 Limitations and future research
Regarding Article 1, it is likely that the forecasting performance could have been
enhanced by disaggregation of the (scaled) earnings into cash ﬂow and accru-
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als, since cash ﬂows are more persistent than accruals (Sloan (1996)). Another
possible disaggregation that might enhance the forecasting accuracy is splitting
earnings into operating earnings and ﬁnancial earnings. Thus, future research
could study whether disaggregation can increase the forecasting accuracy of the
proposed time-series model.
Article 2 only focuses on accounting conservatism from the cost side (i.e. ex-
pensing vs. capitalizing R&D and advertising costs). However, accounting con-
servatism can also arise on the revenue side by the choice of revenue recognition
methods (i.e. completed-contract vs. percentage-of-completion method). Hence,
a natural extension is to focus on unconditional conservatism from the revenue
side.
In relation to Article 3, earlier studies (Sadka and Sadka (2009), Patatoukas (2014))
have made suggestions as to why the Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) is neg-
ative when focusing on the aggregated level. Article 3 only focuses on the relation
between earnings predictability and the ERC at the individual ﬁrm level. How-
ever, since the sign of the ERC is different depending on whether one looks at the
individual ﬁrm level or the aggregated level, it is likely that the relation between
earnings predictability and the ERC also depends on whether the focus is on the
individual ﬁrm level or the aggregated level.
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Using Time-series Properties of Financial
Ratios to Forecast Earnings
Mark Bruun
Copenhagen Business School
Department of Accounting and Auditing
Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract
I forecast earnings from a model based on the time-series properties of ﬁnancial
ratios. This model captures two empirical patterns: mean reversion in ﬁnancial
ratios as well as long-run growth in earnings. I compare the accuracy of these
earnings forecasts with the forecasts from a Random Walk model and analysts’
forecasts based on a sample from 2001–2013. An analysis of the accuracy shows
that the earnings forecast from the ﬁnancial ratio based model are closer to having
an equal frequency of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts than are those from the
Random Walk. However, in terms of forecasting accuracy and mean bias, the
Random Walk model is the superior model.
Keywords: Earnings forecasting, Time-series properties of earnings.
JEL classiﬁcation: G17, C53.
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1 Introduction
Earnings forecasts are used as inputs to estimate the intrinsic value of companies
or infer the cost of capital of companies (also known as the implied cost of capi-
tal). In a practical setting, investors generate and use earnings forecasts when they
asses the value of a company. Furthermore, in a scientiﬁc setting, earnings fore-
casts are used to estimate the implied cost of capital for ﬁrms, which is something
used in ﬁnancial and accounting research.
Empirically, ﬁnancial ratios (such as scaled earnings) converge towards a long-
run level (Nissim and Penman (2001) and Fama and French (2000)), e.g., Return
On Equity (ROE) (and Return On Assets (ROA)) show signs of mean-reversion.
These empirical ﬁndings are in line with economic theory, which suggests that
competition drives the rate of return toward a constant level over time. Further-
more, Nissim and Penman (2001) show that sales growth (and growth in the book
value of equity) converge to a positive constant level. Since revenue and costs are
highly correlated, it is very likely that earnings growth will converge towards the
same rate as sales growth1. Positive long-run earnings growth is also supported by
Myers (1999). He suggests that residual earnings follow a non-stationary (grow-
ing) time-series2. Furthermore, positive long-run growth in earnings is a well
known phenomenon at the macro-level (growth in GDP). Positive long-run GDP
growth means that on average ﬁrms do have positive long-run earnings growth.
In practice, analyst earnings forecasts serve as input to investors for assessing
1Under the assumption that a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability (proﬁt margin) has converged to a constant level, earnings growth
will equal sales growth
2Assuming that Return On Equity (ROE) is constant and different from the cost of equity capital, both residual
earnings and earnings will grow at the same rate, namely the rate of growth in the book value of equity.
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the value of a company. In the implied cost of capital literature, analyst earnings
forecasts are the most widely used measure of the market’s earnings expectations.
However, Lambert et al. (2009) ﬁnd that in the short run (one or two years ahead)
analysts forecast EPS as if EPS follows a Random Walk (RW). This suggests that
analysts use time-series based forecast models in the short run. Lambert et al.
(2009) also ﬁnd that analysts forecast the long-run earnings growth rate (ﬁve-
year growth rate) based on fundamental analysis. However, others (e.g., Lacina
et al. (2011) and Bradshaw et al. (2012)) show that over longer forecast horizons
(ﬁve years), analyst forecasts are not superior to simple time-series based fore-
casts. Since analyst forecasts do not differ from RW forecasts in the short-run and
perform worse than RW forecasts in the long-run, this suggests that enhancing
time-series based forecasting accuracy can help analysts increase their forecast
accuracy3. This might also lead to better stock recommendations generated by
analysts, since Bradshaw (2004) ﬁnd that analysts’ recommendations are highly
associated with the PEG (price/earnings growth) ratio and their estimates of the
long-term growth (LTG) of earnings.
Simple time-series based models, such as the Random Walk (RW) model or the
stationary Autoregressive of order 1 (AR1) model, do not forecast that earnings
3More accurate analyst earnings forecasts are not necessarily a better estimator of the market’s earnings expecta-
tion, because the market’s earnings expectations could be biased. Thus, enhancing the earnings forecast accuracy will
not automatically lead to more efﬁcient implied cost of capital estimates. Moreover, Francis et al. (2000, p. 46) shows
empirically that (on average) the ﬁrst ﬁve-year horizon represents only 7% (100%-72%-21%) of the ﬁrm value in the
abnormal earnings model, whereas the terminal period accounts for 21% of the ﬁrm value. For the free cash ﬂow
(discounted dividend) model, the ﬁrst ﬁve-year horizon equals 18% (35%) of ﬁrm value, compared to the terminal
value that represents 82% (65%) of ﬁrm value. Thus the terminal period accounts for approximately three (two and
ﬁve) times more of the ﬁrm value than the ﬁrst ﬁve-year horizon. This means that, even though a more accurate
earnings forecast would lead to more efﬁcient implied cost of capital estimates, it is still conceivable that enhancing
the accuracy of the analyst earnings forecasts over the ﬁrst ﬁve-year forecast horizon will not lead to signiﬁcantly
more efﬁcient implied cost of capital estimates, since the main part of ﬁrm value is generated in the terminal period.
25
grow in the long run. The non-stationary AR1 or time-series based models with
(exponential) trend produce forecasts where the earnings grow exponentially over
time. However, these time-series models of earnings do not impose a convergence
structure on the ﬁnancial ratios. For instance, if the long-run growth rate in earn-
ings is not equal to the growth rate in book value of equity, this implies that the
ROE does not converge to a constant value. So even the earnings growth con-
vergence which is imposed by these time-series model does not imply that ROE
and growth in book value of equity converge to constant values. To ensure the
convergence of ROE and the growth rate of equity, these two processes have to
be modeled separately. This has not been done in earlier time-series models. In
this paper, I propose a time-series based earnings forecasting model that ensures
long-run earnings growth and expected mean-reversion in ROE and the growth in
book value of equity.
To ensure a) expected mean-reversion in ROE and growth in book value of eq-
uity, and b) long-run growth in earnings forecasts, I propose a time-series based
earnings forecast model (which I will refer to as the Financial Ratio Autoregres-
sive of order 1 (FRAR1) model) that assumes that the ROE and the (logarithm
of) the growth in the book value of equity follow two different stationary AR1
processes. Furthermore, I will derive the implicit long-run expected (residual)
earnings growth rate from the FRAR14. To assess the accuracy of the earnings
forecast, I compare the out-of-sample earnings forecasts from the FRAR1 model
with the out-of-sample forecasts from an RW model of earnings and analysts’
earnings forecasts. Based on data from I/B/E/S over the period 2001–2013, I es-
timate the FRAR1 model (there is nothing to estimate in an RW model).
4The model can be changed to a residual earnings model by changing the ROE process to an unexpected ROE
process.
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The analytical results show that earnings forecasts are a function of the current
book value of equity, the future growth in the book value of equity, and future
proﬁtability (measured by the ROE). The analytical results further show that in
the long run5 the growth in expected earnings will converge to a constant rate,
which is equal to the growth rate in expected book value of equity. Assuming
that the long-run growth in the expected book value of equity and the expected
ROE is positive, long-run expected earnings will be higher than those of the long-
run forecasts of an RW or an AR1 model, since expected long-run earnings from
an RW or an AR1 model will converge to a constant. If implied cost of capital
models assume no growth (or lower growth than the growth in book value of eq-
uity) in (residual) earnings, then their estimates will be lower than those from the
earnings forecasts of the proposed models. The empirical results show that the ac-
curacy and the mean bias of the proposed time-series model are worse than those
of the RW model. However, if the bias size is ignored and one just focuses on
the distribution between optimistic and pessimistic forecasts, the proposed model
generates forecasts that are much closer to a binomial distribution with probabil-
ity parameter of 0.5 (i.e., an equal number of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts)
than do the RW model.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
In Section 3, I describe the model and derive the earnings expectation based on
the model’s time-series parameters. In Section 4, I present the empirical research
design. Sections 4.1 and 5 describe the sample and the results. Section 6 presents
robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
5This could be interpreted as the terminal period, even though a constant level of earnings growth is never reached.
The process only converges toward a constant earnings growth level.
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2 Related research
The earlier literature has analyzed whether analyst forecasts are better than fore-
casts based on statistics. These studies can mainly be divided into two lines of
research. One line focuses on i) whether time-series based forecasts are superior
to analyst forecasts; and another that ii) analyzes whether cross-sectional models
(models that also include other information) perform better than analyst forecasts.
Regarding the ﬁrst line of research, Bradshaw et al. (2012), Lacina et al. (2011)
and Conroy and Harris (1987) have found that analyst earnings forecasts are not
superior to a simple Random Walk (RW) model over longer forecast horizons
(three to ﬁve years). These ﬁndings are in contrast with several earlier studies
(see Bradshaw et al. (2012) for a review of these studies) that show that analyst
earnings forecasts are superior to time-series based earnings forecasts. Bradshaw
et al. (2012) conclude that the superiority of analyst earnings forecasts over time-
series based forecasts is mainly driven by small sample sizes and a bias to large
ﬁrms. Bradshaw et al. (2012) analyze a three-year forecasting period. They ﬁnd
that the superiority of analyst forecasts over RW forecasts declines as the forecast
horizon increases and ﬁnd that in the third year, the RW forecasts are superior to
the analyst forecasts. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Conroy and Harris (1987)
and Lacina et al. (2011) even though they looked at a ﬁve-year forecast horizon.
They also ﬁnd that the superiority of analyst forecasts over RW models declines
over the forecast horizon. Conroy and Harris (1987) ﬁnd that the RW is superior to
analyst forecasts when forecasting earnings ﬁve years ahead. Lacina et al. (2011)
do not ﬁnd that the RW forecasts are superior to analyst forecasts when forecast-
ing earnings ﬁve years ahead. However, when they use a RW with a growth rate,
then they also ﬁnd that it is superior to analyst forecasts when forecasting ﬁve
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years ahead. Thus, over longer forecasting horizons, simple time-series models
seem to perform better than (or just as good as) analyst forecasts. However, in the
short run, analyst forecasts still seem to be superior to time-series based forecasts.
This superiority is mainly due to timing and informational advantages.
With respect to the second line of research, Nissim and Ziv (2001), Fama and
French (2006) and Hou et al. (2012) specify different cross-sectional earnings
forecasting models. All these three models have high in-sample accuracy (R-
squared around 60%–80% for all forecasting years)6. However, only Hou et al.
(2012) studies the out-of-sample forecast performance. Hou et al. (2012) com-
pares their proposed model’s forecast with analyst forecasts. They conclude that
analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate than their proposed cross-sectional
model. However analyst earnings forecasts are more biased and produce lower
Earning Response Coefﬁcients (ERCs). Using a mixed-data sampling (MIDAS)
regression7 Ball et al. (2014) reduce the timing and informational advantages that
analysts have in the short run compared to time-series and cross-sectional based
forecasts, and show that their statistical model outperforms analyst forecasts in
terms of accuracy in the short run (one quarter ahead).
As mentioned above, the model proposed by Hou et al. (2012) outperforms ana-
lyst forecasts in terms of forecast bias and ERC, but is worse in terms of accuracy.
On the other hand, Ball et al. (2014) show that their model is superior to analyst
forecasts in terms of accuracy, but they do not report other performance measures.
There are different dimensions along which to measure forecasting performance.
6The R-square from Fama and French (2006) range from 20% to 39%. This is much lower than the R-squares in
Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Hou et al. (2012). However, this can be explained by the fact that the dependent variables
in Fama and French (2006) are scaled by current book value.
7MIDAS regression allows the regressors to have a higher frequency than the regressand.
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Forecasting performance could be measured a) directly, such as forecast bias and
forecast accuracy (a discussion of direct forecast performance measures and scal-
ing is provided in Section 4.2) and b) indirectly, such as the ERC and absolute
valuation errors (Bach and Christensen (2013)).
3 The income process
In this paper, I forecast earnings by dividing earnings into a function of Return
On Equity (ROE) and growth in book value (of equity). The future book value (of
equity) at time T (BVT ) can be written as the product of the current book value
(of equity) (BV0) and the future growth rate in book value (of equity) (gBVt ):
BVT = BV0
T∏
t=1
(
1 + gBVt
)
Going concerns are rarely insolvent, and therefore I assume that 1 + gBVt > 0 for
all t. Under this assumption, the future book value (of equity) can be written as
BVT = BV0 e
∑T
t=1 ln(1+gBVt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
GT
where GT denotes the accumulated growth in book value (of equity) from time 0
to time T . Expressing the accumulated growth in book value (of equity) as the
exponential of a sum instead of a product has a simple but huge advantage (under
speciﬁc assumptions) when calculating expected values (and covariances). As-
suming that ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
is normally distributed, the expected value of growth
in book value (of equity) is the expected value of the exponential of a normally
distributed variable. The expected value of this follows easily from the moment
generating function, whereas the expected value of a product of normally dis-
tributed variables is much more complex.
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Earnings at time T + 1 are then equal to
INCT+1 = BVTROET+1 = BV0GTROET+1
The earnings forecast at time T +1, given the available information at time 0, Θ0,
is therefore
E[INCT+1|Θ0] = E[BV0GTROET+1|Θ0]
= BV0 (E[GT |Θ0]E[ROET+1|Θ0] + Cov[ROET+1, GT |Θ0]) (1)
Thus the earnings forecasting model requires separate forecasts of the ROE and
the accumulated growth in book value (of equity) and also an estimation of the
covariance between the ROE and the accumulated growth in book value (of eq-
uity).
3.1 Expected value of Return On Equity (ROE)
I model the process of the ROE by an AR1 process, which means that
ROEt = γ + ρROEt−1 + ωt
where 0 < ρ < 1 and ωt ∼ N(0, θ2) and are mutually independent over time8.
This can be (using recursion) rewritten as
ROEt =
γ
1− ρ + ρ
t
(
ROE0 − γ
1− ρ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dt
+
t∑
h=1
ρt−hωh
8When the absolute value of the autoregressive parameter in an AR1 process is less than one (i.e. |ρ| < 1), the
time-series is stationary and this will ensure that the expectation of the process will converge to a constant level in
the long run. Furthermore, requiring the autoregressive parameter estimate to be positive (and still less than one) will
imply that the expected convergence to a long-run constant level will be steady. If the parameter is negative (and
smaller than one in absolute value), this will imply a oscillatory convergence pattern.
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The expectation of ROE given the available information at time 0 is equal to
E [ROEt|Θ0] = E
[
γ
1− ρ + ρ
t
(
ROE0 − γ
1− ρ
)
+
t∑
h=1
ρt−hωh
∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
=
γ
1− ρ + ρ
t
(
ROE0 − γ
1− ρ
)
3.2 Expected value of the accumulated growth in book value
of equity (G )
Like the process of ROE, I model the logarithm of one plus the growth in book
value of equity by an AR1 process:
ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
= α + β ln
(
1 + gBVt−1
)
+ t
where 0 < β < 1 and the t ∼ N(0, σ2) are mutually independent over time.
Modeling the growth in book value of equity as an AR1 process might seem
more appealing, because the structural relation between the ROE and the growth
in book value of equity9 could be built into the model. However (as noted earlier)
this would make the analysis a lot more complicated.
One way to still be able to model the growth in book value of equity as an AR1
process (instead of as the logarithm of one plus the growth in book value of eq-
uity) is to use a Taylor approximation. The ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of
ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
around 0 is equal to gBVt . However, the errors of the Taylor ap-
proximation becomes larger the longer we move away from 0. Thus for values
of
∣∣gBVt ∣∣ close to 0, the approximation is good. However if the values of gBVt lie
9Assuming the Clean Surplus Relation holds, then the growth in the book value of equity equals the ROE plus the
net dividend ratio, deﬁned as the net dividend divided by the initial book value of equity.
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in the interval [-50%–50%], the approximation of ln
(
1 + gBVt
) ≈ gBVt is a poor
approximation for the whole interval. A growth in the book value of equity of
about -/+50% is not that uncommon for ﬁrms. Therefore, it is ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
that I
model as an AR1 process.
In Appendix A, it is shown that the expected value of the accumulated growth
in book value of equity equals
E
[
e
∑T
t=1 ln(1+gBVt )
∣∣∣Θ0] = E [GT |Θ0] = ATe 12HT
where
AT = e
α
1−βT+
β(1−βT)
1−β (ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β)
and
HT = σ
2
⎛⎝T − 2β(1−βT+1)1−β + β2(1−β2(T+1))1−β2
(1− β)2
⎞⎠
3.3 Covariance between ROE and G
Assume that X = μ+ω and that ln(Y ) = γ+ , where μ and γ are constants and
where ω ∼ N (0, θ2) and  ∼ N (0, σ2). Then the covariance between X and Y
equals
Cov [XY ] = Cov
[
X, eln(Y )
]
= Cov
[
μ+ ω , eγ+
]
= E[μeγ+ + ωeγ+]− E[μ+ ω]E[eγ+]
= E[μeγ+] + E[ωeγ+]− μE[eγ+] = E[ωeγ+] = eγE[ωe]
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This means that
Cov[ROET+1, GT |Θ0]
= Cov
[
DT+1 +
T+1∑
i=1
ρT+1−iωi , ATe
∑T
t=1
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
= ATCov
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
T+1∑
i=1
ρT+1−iωi︸ ︷︷ ︸
υT+1
, e
1
2
ηT︷ ︸︸ ︷
2
T∑
t=1
t∑
h=1
βt−hh
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Θ0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
From Stein’s Lemma, we then get that
Cov[ROET+1, GT |Θ0] = ATE
[
∂e
1
2ηT
∂ηT
]
Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
=
1
2
ATE
[
e
1
2ηT
]
Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
Furthermore (as noted in Appendix A), we get from the moment generating func-
tion that E
[
e
1
2ηT
]
= e
1
8V ar[ηT |Θ0]. Thus
Cov[ROET+1, GT |Θ0] = 1
2
ATe
1
8V ar[ηT |Θ0]Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
where
AT = e
α
1−βT+
β(1−βT)
1−β (ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β)
as in Section 3.2, and expressions for the variance of υT+1 and ηT as well as their
covariance are given in Appendix B.
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Since V ar[ηT |Θ0] = 4HT , this means that
Cov[ROET+1, GT |Θ0] = 1
2
ATe
1
2HTCov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
=
1
2
E[GT |Θ0]Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
Inserting the expression for the expected value of ROE, the expected value of the
accumulated growth in book value of equity, and the covariance between ROE
and accumulated growth in book value of equity into Equation 1 implies that the
forecast of period T earnings is
E[INCT |Θ0] = BV0E[GT−1|Θ0]
(
E[ROET |Θ0] + 1
2
Cov[υT , ηT−1|Θ0]
)
(2)
Using the FRAR1 model to estimate ﬁrms’ intrinsic values (with the going con-
cern assumption) or to estimate ﬁrms’ implied cost of capital requires endless
forecasts of earnings. Therefore it is interesting to analyze how the earnings pro-
cess modeled by the FRAR1 model behaves in the long run (i.e., as T goes to
inﬁnity). It can be observed that the expectation of earnings in the long run is
divergent. Therefore, focusing on the growth in expected earnings in the long run
makes more sense. In Appendix C, I show that the growth in expected earnings
is a function of the expected long-run growth (and volatility) of the book value of
equity.
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4 Empirical analysis
I compare the accuracy of out-of-sample earnings forecasts of the FRAR1 model
with those of the Random Walk (RW) model and of analyst forecasts over a ﬁve-
year forecasting period. When estimating the FRAR1 model, I allow the error
terms in the two AR1 processes to be correlated, because ROE and growth in
book value of equity are very likely to be positively correlated. Thus, the two
AR1 processes can not be estimated separately. Therefore, I rewrite the model as
a restricted VAR1 model and estimate it. The VAR1 model is
Yt = A+BYt−1 + Et
where
Yt =
⎡⎣ ROEt
ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
⎤⎦ , Yt−1 =
⎡⎣ ROEt−1
ln
(
1 + gBVt−1
)
⎤⎦ , Et =
⎡⎣ ωt
t
⎤⎦
and
A =
⎡⎣ γ
α
⎤⎦ , B =
⎡⎣ ρ 0
0 β
⎤⎦ , Σ =
⎡⎣ θ2 ψ
ψ σ2
⎤⎦
To generate the forecasts for years one to ﬁve from the FRAR1 model, I plug
the estimated elements (i.e. γ, α, ρ, β, θ, σ and ψ) from the A, B and Σ matrices
of the VAR1 model10 into Equation 2. By varying T from one to ﬁve I get the
forecast for years one to ﬁve.
10Note that the notation for the the covariance between the error terms in the VAR1 model is ψ, although it is
denoted by Cov[ωi, i] in the analytical derivation of the FRAR1 model.
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For the empirical analysis, there are some issues related to the data. There are
two main data issues: a) the length of the time-series of annual earnings and b)
the deﬁnition of earnings. Regarding the ﬁrst issue, the time-series of annual earn-
ings are relatively short (normally around 10–15 years). So the seven parameter
estimates (i.e. γ, α, ρ, β, θ, σ and ψ) will on average be based on only 10–15
observations when the FRAR1 model is estimated at the ﬁrm level. However, the
FRAR1 model could be estimated for groups of ﬁrms. Estimating the parameters
at the group level increases the size of the estimation sample (and thereby reduces
the inﬂuence of outliers). On the other hand, a group level estimation assumes the
homogeneity of the time-series parameters across the ﬁrms in the sample group.
Now, the mean-reversion pattern as well as the long-run ROE are likely to be the
same within an industry11. Thus I estimate the time-series parameters of the VAR1
model at the industry level12 using the least squares method. For AR (and VAR)
models, the least squares estimate is biased because of a violation of the assump-
tion of the independence of the regressor and the error term. To control for this
estimation bias, different bias-correction methods have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Engsted and Pedersen (2014) show that for stationary series, the analytical
bias-correction formula for VAR processes is just as good as more complicated
correction procedures (such as bootstrap methods). Furthermore, they show that
when the sample size is 200, the bias is very close to zero. Therefore, I require at
least 200 observations per sample group.
Regarding the earnings deﬁnition issue, Compustat earnings and I/B/E/S earn-
ings are deﬁned differently. Compustat uses the US GAAP earnings deﬁnition,
11The mean-reverting patterns in Nissim and Penman (2001) are also based on groups of ﬁrms. However, here the
group formation is not based on industry, but on the level of the ratio.
12The industry is categorized according to the 2-digit SIC code.
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whereas I/B/E/S use the so called “Street earnings” deﬁnition. Abarbanell and
Lehavy (2007) describes how the I/B/E/S earnings measure excludes nonrecur-
ring items, other special items, and non-operating items in the GAAP earnings
measure. Also, they point out that the difference between I/B/E/S and GAAP
earnings can never be traced back to raw data. The I/B/E/S database is less com-
prehensive than Compustat with respect to the historical period and the number
of ﬁrms included, and thus will lead to a smaller estimation sample. Hou et al.
(2012) deal with this problem by calculating the analyst forecast errors based on
the realized I/B/E/S earnings and the forecasting errors from their proposed model
on the realized US GAAP earnings. However, it is wrong to compare forecasting
errors when they are based on different variables13. Thus, to ensure consistency in
the deﬁnition of earnings, I estimate the FRAR1 model on data from the I/B/E/S
database, even though I recognize the estimation sample will be smaller than when
the FRAR1 model is estimated based on Compustat.
4.1 Sample Selection
The data sample used in the analysis is the intersection of the available forecasts
from the FRAR1 model and the analysts. All observations with non-missing data
(or data equal to zero) for the ﬁscal year of Book value of Equity Per Share (BPS)
and of Earnings Per Share (EPS) are used. Firms with an SIC code in [4900–
4999] or in [6000–6999] are excluded. These are regulated ﬁrms, such as utilities
and ﬁnancial institutions. To reduce the inﬂuence of outliers on the parameter es-
timates, I exclude observations where the common equity is negative, the absolute
value of ROE is larger than one, or the absolute growth in book value of equity is
13Hou et al. (2012) also calculate the analyst and the model forecasting errors where both are based on the same
earnings deﬁnition. This is also wrong since the analyst forecast earnings are I/B/E/S earnings and the model involves
US GAAP earnings.
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larger than one14. I Winsorize all independent and the dependent variables at the
top and bottom 1% level. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables
used in the FRAR1 model. The table shows that the distribution of EPS and BPS
is upper skewed, since the mean is much higher than the median.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Period Variable Mean Median No. Obs.
t+0 BPS 457.102 7.26 8983
t+0 Growth in BPS 0.035 0.059 8968
t+0 ROE 0.074 0.112 8400
t+0 EPS 0.933 0.78 8414
t+1 BPS 93.492 7.98 6673
t+1 Growth in BPS 0.088 0.068 6651
t+1 ROE 0.047 0.11 7262
t+1 EPS 0.929 0.79 7286
t+2 BPS 22.334 8.533 4937
t+2 Growth in BPS 0.083 0.065 4708
t+2 ROE 0.069 0.116 5271
t+2 EPS 0.967 0.81 6018
t+3 BPS 13.459 9.42 3565
t+3 Growth in BPS 0.085 0.068 3332
t+3 ROE 0.083 0.121 3935
t+3 EPS 1.102 0.85 4971
t+4 BPS 13.427 10.26 2621
t+4 Growth in BPS 0.06 0.079 2377
t+4 ROE 0.125 0.131 2858
t+4 EPS 1.285 0.89 4075
t+5 BPS 13.871 10.706 2046
t+5 Growth in BPS 0.304 0.083 1810
t+5 ROE 0.156 0.149 2036
t+5 EPS 1.401 0.98 3330
Mean and median values of the variables and number of observations for each variable over the ﬁve-
year forecasting period. Period t + k indicates the j-year ahead forecast. Firm–year observations
are pooled: thus the ﬁscal year for forecasting period t+ k could differ across ﬁrms (and also for a
speciﬁc ﬁrm if forecasts are repeated for the same ﬁrm).
“BPS” is the Book Value of Equity Per Share. “Growth in BPS” is the growth-rate of Book Value
of Equity Per Share. “ROE” is Return On Equity. “EPS” is Earnings Per Share.
14As shown in Section 3, the variance of the growth in BV increases with time due to persistence. This means that
large variance estimates are extraordinarily inﬂated. So to deal with large variance estimates for the growth in book
value of equity, I exclude observations where the growth in equity is larger than 1.
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4.2 Measurement of the forecast bias and accuracy
The most common accuracy measures in the forecasting literature are the
mean/median absolute error (MAE/MdAE), the mean/median absolute percent-
age error (MAPE/MdAPE), and the weighted mean absolute percentage error
(wMAPE).
The forecast error is equal to the difference between the actual value and the
forecast value. Let Ai denote the actual value for observation i, where i could
indicate the time or the group or a combination of time and group. Then let Fi
denote the forecast for observation i. The absolute error and absolute percentage
error for observation i is deﬁned as follows:
AEi = |Ai − Fi|
APEi =
∣∣∣∣Ai − FiAi
∣∣∣∣
Let mean(x) denote the mean of x and median(x) its median. This means that,
e.g., MAE and MAPE are deﬁned by
MAE = Mean(AE) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Ai − Fi|
MAPE = Mean(APE) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ai − FiAi
∣∣∣∣
where n is the number of observations forecast.
The forecast error measures MAE (MdAE) are scale-dependent measures, which
means that the error is dependent on the actual level. This means that since com-
parison is done on a wide sample of companies, including both very large com-
panies and very small, a very high MAE (MdAE) could emerge even though the
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model makes very accurate forecasts for small companies.
MAPE (MdAPE) are forecast error measures that are supposed to be not scale-
dependent, since the forecast error is measured relatively to the actual value. How-
ever, in the earnings forecasting literature, the most widely used scale-independent
measure is neither MAPE nor MdAPE: instead, a price-deﬂated measure is used.
This price-deﬂated measure is deﬁned as the absolute error deﬂated by the stock
price15. However, as Jacob et al. (1999) notes, using the absolute price-deﬂated
error (APDE) as a measure of forecast accuracy has drawbacks. Often there are
large ﬂuctuations in the APDE over the years. This stems from the fact that price-
deﬂated absolute forecast errors could be rewritten as MAPE times the inverse
price–earnings ratios16, which means that the APDE is a function of the forecast
accuracy and a valuation multiple.
Hyndman and Koehler (2006) point out that these scale-independent measures
have some other problems as well. When any actual value (stock price) is close
to zero, the distribution of MAPE (APDE) is extremely skewed, since the MAPE
(APDE) approaches inﬁnity when the actual value (stock price) approaches zero.
Forecast errors where the actual value (stock price) is close to zero will therefore
be weighted much more highly than forecast errors for which the actual value
(stock price) is higher.
To deal with this small denominator problem, Lacina et al. (2011) Winsorize the
APE (and APDE) values above one. Another approach, which Gu and Wu (2003)
15The absolute error is deﬂated by the stock price when forecasting earnings per share. When forecasting earnings,
it is deﬂated by the market value of the ﬁrm
16APDE = Ei−FiPi =
Ei−Fi
Ei
Ei
Pi
= MAPEi
Ei
Pi
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use, is to require that the demonimator (stock price) be at least three (dollars).
The accuracy measures presented here are linear loss functions (in contrast to,
e.g., the mean squared error, which is a quadratic loss function). Assuming
that analysts have quadratic loss functions, Basu and Markov (2004) show that
analysts do not process public information efﬁciently. However, under the as-
sumption that the analysts’ loss function are instead linear, they show that ana-
lysts’ forecasts are efﬁcient. This suggests that analysts’ loss functions are linear.
Therefore accuracy measures with a linear loss function are appropriate when
comparing forecasting accuracy that includes analysts’ forecasts.
The main part of the literature (Lacina et al. (2011), Bradshaw et al. (2012),
Hou et al. (2012)) on time-series/cross-sectional based earnings forecast accuracy
versus analyst earnings forecast accuracy scale by the stock price (i.e. a price-
deﬂated measure). I follow this line of the literature and use the mean/median ab-
solute price-deﬂated error (MAPDE/MdAPDE) accuracy measure. To deal with
the small denominator problem, I use the Winsorizing approach from Lacina et al.
(2011).
Forecast bias measures could be deﬁned analogously to the forecast accuracy
measures by calculating the forecast error instead of the absolute value of the fore-
cast error. Therefore I use the mean/median price-deﬂated error (MPDE/MdPDE)
as a forecast bias measure.
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5 Results
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the VAR(1) model. The table shows
that all the industry–year sets of parameter estimates are stationary and will con-
verge steadily to a long-run level (i.e. 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < β < 1). Furthermore,
as expected, the error terms from the two autoregressive processes are positively
correlated (i.e. ψ > 0)17.
Table 2: Parameter Estimates
SIC Code Year γ ρ α β θ σ ψ No. Obs.
13 2007 0.10 0.45 0.08 0.42 0.12 0.24 0.02 222
13 2013 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.01 591
20 2013 0.03 0.85 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.01 273
28 2005 -0.01 0.84 -0.05 0.55 0.18 0.31 0.01 317
28 2013 0.03 0.77 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.28 0.01 636
35 2005 0.04 0.64 0.03 0.46 0.12 0.21 0.01 280
35 2013 0.06 0.68 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.01 607
36 2005 0.01 0.79 -0.01 0.49 0.11 0.24 0.01 376
36 2014 0.05 0.66 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.25 0.01 273
37 2008 0.02 0.82 -0.02 0.40 0.12 0.31 0.02 209
37 2013 0.06 0.68 0.04 0.25 0.11 0.24 0.01 300
38 2005 0.01 0.80 -0.01 0.60 0.11 0.24 0.01 311
38 2013 0.03 0.77 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.01 537
48 2008 0.01 0.69 -0.09 0.24 0.15 0.41 0.03 203
48 2013 0.04 0.59 -0.04 0.15 0.16 0.34 0.02 292
50 2013 0.09 0.45 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.01 255
73 2005 0.04 0.63 0.03 0.36 0.11 0.25 0.01 490
73 2013 0.07 0.60 0.06 0.31 0.11 0.23 0.01 995
Parameter estimates for the VAR1 model by 2-digit SIC code and ﬁscal year. For clarity, only the
ﬁrst and last ﬁscal year for each 2-digit SIC code are shown. In total there are 62 sets of parameter
estimates distributed over 10 2-digit SIC code industries.
Tables 3 and 4 present the mean and median price deﬂated forecast errors (MPDE
and MdPE), also known as the mean and median bias.
17For clarity, only the ﬁrst and last ﬁscal year for each 2-digit SIC code are shown in Table 2. In total there are
62 sets of parameter estimates distributed over 10 2-digit SIC code industries. The other 44 industry–year sets of
parameter estimates that are untabulated are similar to the presented ones
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Table 3: Forecast Bias—Mean Price Deﬂated Error
Model
Period t+1 Period t+2 Period t+3 Period t+4 Period t+5
MPDE No. Obs. MPDE No. Obs. MPDE No. Obs. MPDE No. Obs. MPDE No. Obs.
FRAR1 −0.013 5961 −0.031 4406 −0.024 2489 −0.027 1889 −0.023 1500
Random Walk 0 5961 0 4406 0.007 2489 0.013 1889 0.015 1500
Analyst Forecast −0.022 5961 −0.044 4406 −0.046 2489 −0.063 1889 −0.077 1500
Forecast bias measured by the Mean Price Deﬂated Error (MPDE) over the ﬁve-year forecasting
period for the proposed model in the paper (FRAR1), the Random Walk, and Analyst Forecasts.
Period t+ k indicates the j-year ahead forecast. Firm–year observations are pooled, thus the ﬁscal
year for forecasting period t + k could differ across ﬁrms (and also for a speciﬁc ﬁrm if forecasts
are repeated for the same ﬁrm).
Table 3 shows that the FRAR1 model and the analyst forecasts are too optimistic
(i.e., negative forecast bias) over the whole ﬁve-year forecasting period. The signs
on the mean forecast bias for the RW model suggest that the RW model forecasts
are unbiased in the ﬁrst two years, whereas in the next three years they are too
pessimistic (i.e., positive forecast bias). Furthermore, it shows that the RW model
has the lowest (unsigned) mean forecast bias and that the analyst forecasts have
the highest.
Table 4: Forecast Bias—Median Price Deﬂated Error
Model
Period t+1 Period t+2 Period t+3 Period t+4 Period t+5
MdPDE No. Obs. MdPDE No. Obs. MdPDE No. Obs. MdPDE No. Obs. MdPDE No. Obs.
FRAR1 0.006 5961 0.006 4406 0.009 2489 0.011 1889 0.013 1500
Random Walk 0.004 5961 0.008 4406 0.012 2489 0.016 1889 0.018 1500
Analyst Forecast 0.003 5961 −0.003 4406 −0.004 2489 −0.01 1889 −0.017 1500
Forecast bias measured by the Median Price Deﬂated Error (MdPDE) over the ﬁve-year forecasting
period for the proposed model in the paper (FRAR1), the Random Walk, and Analyst Forecasts.
Period t+ k indicates the j-year ahead forecast. Firm–year observations are pooled, thus the ﬁscal
year for forecasting period t + k could differ across ﬁrms (and also for a speciﬁc ﬁrm if forecasts
are repeated for the same ﬁrm).
However, Table 4 shows that the FRAR1 model has the lowest (unsigned) me-
dian forecast bias in forecasting in year ﬁve, whereas in years one to four, the
analyst forecasts have the lowest. Furthermore, it shows that the RW model has
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the highest (unsigned) median forecast bias in all years except year one, where
the FRAR1 model have the highest. The signs of the median forecast bias show
that the RW and FRAR1 model are too pessimistic, whereas the analyst forecasts
are too optimistic (except for year one). Overall, the two tables do not clearly
suggest which forecast has the lowest bias. On the other hand, Table 5 shows the
percentage of forecasts where the forecast error is positive.
Table 5: Forecast Bias—Percentage of Positive Forecast Errors
Model
Period t+1 Period t+2 Period t+3 Period t+4 Period t+5
PPPE No. Obs. PPPE No. Obs. PPPE No. Obs. PPPE No. Obs. PPPE No. Obs.
FRAR1 0.611 5961 0.569 4406 0.595 2489 0.608 1889 0.622 1500
Random Walk 0.618 5961 0.633 4406 0.681 2489 0.695 1889 0.722 1500
Analyst Forecast 0.558 5961 0.462 4406 0.442 2489 0.39 1889 0.322 1500
Forecast bias measured by the Percentage of Positive Forecast Errors (PPFE) over the ﬁve-year
forecasting period for the proposed model in the paper (FRAR1), the Random Walk, and Analyst
Forecasts. Period t+k indicates the j-year ahead forecast. Firm–year observations are pooled, thus
the ﬁscal year for forecasting period t + k could differ across ﬁrms (and also for a speciﬁc ﬁrm if
forecasts are repeated for the same ﬁrm).
This shows that the FRAR1 model produces forecasts that are a little more often
pessimistic than optimistic (around 60% of the time) for the whole forecasting
period. However, Table 5 further shows that the RW model produces forecasts
that more often are pessimistic compared to the FRAR1 model. As the forecast-
ing horizon increases, the frequency of pessimistic forecasts relative to optimistic
forecasts increases as well for the RW model. At the ﬁve-year forecasting hori-
zon, the RW model produces pessimistic forecasts approximately 70% of the time.
With respect to analyst forecasts, the pattern is almost the same as the RW model
except that the analyst forecasts are too optimistic. This forecast optimism bias in
analyst forecasts is in line with ﬁndings in earlier research.
Tables 6 and 7 present the mean and median absolute price deﬂated forecast errors
(MAPDE and MdAPDE).
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Table 6 shows that the RW earnings forecasts are the most accurate in terms
of MAPDE and that the analyst forecasts are the least accurate. In terms of
MdAPDE, Table 7 shows that the FRAR1 model is the least accurate. This sug-
gests that some of the analyst forecasts are much worse than the FRAR1 model,
but analyst forecasts more often are more accurate than the FRAR1 model fore-
casts.
5.1 Enhancing the forecast performance of FRAR1
The poor accuracy of the FRAR1 model compared to the RW model could be
driven by the model speciﬁcation. In the following, I propose two different rea-
sons for the poor forecasting performance of the FRAR1 model relative to the RW
model. Furthermore, I propose possible solutions for enhancing the forecasting
performance of the FRAR1 model, in terms of accuracy, for future research.
5.1.1 Non-constant convergence rate
Fama and French (2000) ﬁnd that “mean reversion is faster when proﬁtability is
below its mean and when it is further from its mean in either direction.” Likewise
Hayn (1995) and Basu (1997) show that, on average, losses are less persistent
than proﬁts. Thus, estimating the time-series parameters separately for ﬁrms that
are above and below the long-run level could enhance the accuracy of FRAR1.
There are two ways to do this: either the estimation sample data could be split
into two parts or the time-series parameters could be estimated from one sample
where an interaction term between the lagged earnings and an indicator variable
(which should take the value of one when ROE0 > ROELR and zero otherwise)
is included in the model. However, the latter method would lead to two different
long-run levels, since the long-run level is equal to the constant divided by one
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minus the autoregressive parameter.
Sloan (1996) ﬁnd that there is a difference in persistence in the components of
earnings, i.e., the cash ﬂow component and the accruals component. Sloan (1996)
ﬁnd that cash ﬂows are more persistent than accruals. Thus dividing earnings
into cash ﬂows and accruals might enhance the accuracy of forecasting from the
FRAR1 model.
5.1.2 Segregation
The decomposition of ﬁnancial ratios into a larger set of lower level ratios is
widely used when analyzing ﬁnancial statements, both in practice and in research.
By segregating ROE (and/or the growth in book value of equity) into more com-
ponents, forecasting accuracy can be enhanced. ROE can be decomposed (Nissim
and Penman (2001)) into
ROE = RNOA+ LEV (RNOA−NBC) (3)
where RNOA is Return on Net Operating Assets, LEV is ﬁnancial leverage, and
NBC is net borrowing costs. Esplin et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the forecasting accuracy
of ROE can be enhanced by separately forecasting the components (the right hand
side of Equation 3) of ROE. In addition, ROE could be decomposed even fur-
ther by decomposing RNOA into proﬁt margin (PM) and Asset Turnover (ATO).
Fairﬁeld and Yohn (2001) and Soliman (2008) ﬁnd that the accuracy of forecast-
ing the change in Return On Assets (ROA) can be enhanced by disaggregating
the change in ROA into the change in PM and the change in ATO. Furthermore,
Fairﬁeld et al. (1996) decompose ROE additively in four steps: 1.) into nonre-
curring and recurring items, 2.) separating special items from recurring items, 3.)
separating operating earnings from recurring items without special items, 4.) a
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full separation of line items (such as SGA expenses, depreciation, interest, tax).
Fairﬁeld et al. (1996) ﬁnd that disaggregating ROE improves the forecasting ac-
curacy and that the improvement increases with increasing disaggregation. Thus
disaggregating ROE into lower level components could enhance the accuracy of
forecasting from the FRAR1 model.
6 Robustness check
6.1 Industry deﬁnition
The deﬁnition of each industry probably inﬂuences the forecasting performance,
since the “optimal” industry deﬁnition is the one that maximizes the homogeneity
across ﬁrms of the time-series parameters for the ROE and growth in book value
of equity. Homogeneity could be increased by increasing the number of industry
segments. On the other hand, this would reduce the number of observations used
to estimate the time-series parameters. Thus, choosing the “optimal” industry
classiﬁcation is a trade-off between homogeneity and sample size. The optimal
industry classiﬁcation is purely an empirical question. Using 2-digit NAICS codes
as well as 1- and 2-digit SIC codes yield similar results.
6.2 Sample period
Time-series parameters can be highly inﬂuenced by a ﬁnancial crisis. Including
observations from the period of the ﬁnancial crisis may lead to biased autore-
gressive parameters as well as positively biased volatility estimates. Using only
observations before the ﬁnancial crisis (2007) yields similar results.
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6.3 Multiple forecasts for the same ﬁrm
The number of forecasts per ﬁrm (i.e. forecasts for the same ﬁrm at different
points in time) varies across ﬁrms. However, one might expect the variation in
the number of forecasts per ﬁrm to be low since most ﬁrms have existed over the
whole period. However, for the forecast to be included in the accuracy analysis,
it requires analyst forecasts, FRAR1 forecasts, as well as stock prices. These
constraints increase the variation in the number of forecasts per ﬁrm. It is very
likely that the forecast accuracy is correlated over time for the same ﬁrm. So if the
accuracy of analyst forecasts is poor for ﬁrms with a higher number of forecasts,
the results could be driven by a small number of ﬁrms. One way to deal with this
is to only include one forecast per ﬁrm. Using the earliest (or the latest) forecast
yield similar results.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposed an earnings forecasting model based on the time-series prop-
erties of ﬁnancial ratios. The model captures two important earlier empirical ﬁnd-
ings: mean-reversion in ﬁnancial ratios and long-run growth in earnings. I showed
that the expected earnings growth in the long run for this model equals the ex-
pected long-run growth in book value of equity multiplied by a factor smaller
than one. Thus, the expected earnings growth in the long run is smaller than the
expected long-run growth in the book value of equity.
In addition, I analyzed the model’s forecast accuracy in comparison to that of
the Random Walk model and of analyst forecasts. The results showed that the
RW model is superior to these two other forecasts in terms of accuracy and mean
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bias. However, the earnings forecasts based on ﬁnancial ratios seem to be supe-
rior in terms of equality in the number of forecasts that are too low with those that
are too high over longer forecast horizons (four to ﬁve years ahead). The results
show that the optimism (pessimism) in analyst (RW) forecasts increases with the
forecast horizon, suggesting that analysts’ expected earnings growth rates are too
high and that the implied expectation of zero growth in earnings for the RW fore-
casts is too low (i.e. earnings grow on average over time). The results are not
inﬂuenced by the sample period, industry deﬁnition, or auto-correlation of accu-
racy errors.
The earlier literature (e.g., Bansal et al. (2012)) has found that combination fore-
casts can generate more accurate forecasts than single forecasts. Thus further re-
search should evaluate whether using combination forecasts of the FRAR1 model,
the Random Walk, and other time-series models, can enhance the forecasting ac-
curacy.
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A Derivation of the expected value of the accumu-
lated growth in book value of equity (G)
In the same way as with the process of the ROE, the (logarithm of one plus)
growth in book value of equity can be rewritten as
ln
(
1 + gBVt
)
=
α
1− β + β
t
(
ln
(
1 + gBV0
)− α
1− β
)
+
t∑
h=1
βt−hh
This means that the forecast of GT at time 0 will be
E [GT |Θ0] =
[
e
∑T
j=1 ln(1+gBVt )
∣∣∣Θ0]
= E
[
e
∑T
t=1( α1−β+βt(ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β)+
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh)
∣∣∣Θ0]
= E
[
e
∑T
t=1( α1−β+βt(ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β))e
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣Θ0]
= e
∑T
t=1( α1−β+βt(ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β))E
[
e
∑T
t=1
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣Θ0]
= e
α
1−βT+
β(1−βT)
1−β (ln(1+gBV0 )− α1−β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
E
[
e
∑T
t=1
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣Θ0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
BT
Looking at the term BT , we can rewrite this as
E
[
e
∑T−1
t=0 β
t1+
∑T−2
t=0 β
t2+···+
∑0
t=0 β
tT
∣∣∣Θ0] (4)
Since the error terms t are all mutually independent, we can split this into
E
[
e
∑T−1
t=0 β
t1
∣∣∣Θ0]E [e∑T−2t=0 βt2∣∣∣Θ0] · · ·E [e∑0t=0 βtT ∣∣∣Θ0] (5)
We get from the moment generating function that E[etX ] = etμX+
1
2 t
2σ2X if X is
normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ. This means that
E
[
ei
∑T−i
t=0 β
t
∣∣∣Θ0] = e 12σ2( 1−βT−i+11−β )2
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Putting all this together, we get that
E
[
e
∑T
t=1
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣Θ0] = e 12σ2∑Ti=0( 1−βT−i+11−β )2 = e 12σ2∑Ti=0( 1−βi+11−β )2
which can be rewritten as
BT = E
[
e
∑T
t=1
∑t
h=1 β
t−hh
∣∣∣Θ0] = e
1
2
HT︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ2
⎛⎝T − 2β(1−βT+1)1−β + β2(1−β2(T+1))1−β2
(1− β)2
⎞⎠
We then have the following expression for the growth in book value of equity
from time 0 to time t.
E [GT |Θ0] = ATe 12HT
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B Variance and covariance calculations
B.1 Variance of υT+1
The variance of ω given the available information at time 0 is
V ar[υT+1|Θ0] = V ar
[
T+1∑
h=1
ρT+1−hωh
∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
=
T+1∑
h=1
ρ2(T+1−h)V ar [ωh|Θ0] + 2
T∑
k=1
T+1∑
j=k+1
ρkρjcov[ωk, ωj|Θ0]
=
T+1∑
h=1
ρ2(T+1−h)θ2 =
1− ρ2(T+1)
1− ρ2 θ
2
B.2 Variance of ηT
It follows directly from the calculations in Section 3.2 that
V ar[ηT |Θ0] = V ar
[
2
T∑
t=1
t∑
h=1
βt−hh
∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
= 4V ar
[
T∑
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]
= 4HT = 4σ
2
⎛⎝T − 2β(1−βT+1)1−β + β2(1−β2(T+1))1−β2
(1− β)2
⎞⎠
B.3 Covariance between υT+1 and ηT
Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0] = Cov
[(
T+1∑
i=1
ρT+1−iωi
)(
2
T∑
t=1
t∑
h=1
βt−hh
)∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
= 2E
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]
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From Section 3.2, we see that
T∑
t=1
t∑
h=1
βt−hh =
T∑
i=1
i
T−i∑
t=1
βt =
T∑
i=1
i
(
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)
which means that
Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0] = 2E
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i=1
ρT+1−iωi
)(
T∑
i=1
i
(
1− βT+1−i
1− β
))∣∣∣∣∣Θ0
]
Assuming that Cov[ωi, j|Θ0] = 0 for i = j and that the covariance is stationary
over time, so that Cov[ωi, i|Θ0] = Cov[ωj, j|Θ0] for all i and j, we obtain
Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0] = 2
1− βCov[ωi, i|Θ0]
T∑
i=1
ρT+1−i
(
1− βT+1−i)
=
2
1− βCov[ωi, i|Θ0]
((
T∑
i=1
ρT+1−i
)
−
T∑
i=1
(ρβ)T+1−i
)
=
2
1− βCov[ωi, i|Θ0]
(
1− ρT+1
1− ρ −
1− (ρβ)T+1
1− ρβ
)
55
C The growth in expected earnings in the long run
The growth in expected earnings in the long run
(
i.e. limT→∞
E[INCT+1|Θ0]
E[INCT |Θ0]
)
is equal to
lim
T→∞
BV0E[GT |Θ0]
(
E[ROET+1|Θ0] + 12
√
V ar[υT+1|Θ0]Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
)
BV0E[GT−1|Θ0]
(
E[ROET |Θ0] + 12
√
V ar[υT |Θ0]Cov[υT , ηT−1|Θ0]
)
Using the product rule for limits this can be rewritten as
lim
T→∞
E[GT |Θ0]
E[GT−1|Θ0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
XT
lim
T→∞
E[ROET+1|Θ0] + 12
√
V ar[υT+1|Θ0]Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
E[ROET |Θ0] + 12
√
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The XT term is equal to
XT = lim
T→∞
ATe
1
2HT
AT−1e
1
2HT−1
= lim
T→∞
AT
AT−1
lim
T→∞
e
1
2 (HT−HT−1) = e
α
1−β e
1
2(
σ
1−β)
2
= e
α
1−β+
1
2(
σ
1−β)
2
When analyzing the YT term, let, for simplicity,
f(T + 1) = E [ROET+1|θ0] + 1
2
√
V ar[υT+1|Θ0]Cov[υT+1, ηT |Θ0]
Using the division rule for limits, the YT term can be written as
YT = lim
T→∞
f(T )
f(T )
=
limT→∞ f(T + 1)
limT→∞ f(T )
as long as both limT→∞ f(T + 1) and limT→∞ f(T ) exist.
To show that limT→∞ f(T ) exists, the addition rule and the product rule for limits
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is needed. This gives
lim
T→∞
f(T )
= lim
T→∞
(
E [ROET |Θ0] + 1
2
√
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)
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2
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The long-run expectation of ROET given the information available at time 0 is
equal to
lim
T→∞
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T→∞
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γ
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The long-run expectation of Cov[υT , ηT−1|Θ0] is equal to
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1− βCov[ωi, i|Θ0]
(
1
1− ρ −
1
1− ρβ
)
So limT→∞ f(T ) exists. It can be seen that limT→∞ f(T + 1) also exists and that
limT→∞ f(T ) = limT→∞ f(T + 1), which means that YT = 1. Therefore
lim
T→∞
E[INCT+1|Θ0]
E[INCT |Θ0] = e
α
1−β+
1
2(
σ
1−β)
2
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Since E
[
1 + gBVT |Θ0
]
= E
[
eln(1+g
BV
T )|Θ0
]
and limT→∞ ln
(
1 + gBVT
)
is nor-
mally distributed with limT→∞E
[
ln
(
1 + gBVT
) |Θ0] = α1−β and
limT→∞ V ar
[
ln
(
1 + gBVT
) |Θ0] = σ21−β2 , we get from the moment generating
function that
E
[
1 + gBVT |Θ0
]
= e
α
1−β+
1
2
σ2
1−β2
which means that
lim
T→∞
E[INCT+1|Θ0]
E[INCT |Θ0] = E
[
1 + gBVT |Θ0
]
e
1
2σ
2
(
1
(1−β)2− 11−β2
)
= E
[
1 + gBVT |Θ0
]
e
− 12σ2 2β(1+β)(1−β)2(1−β2)
Thus the growth in expected earnings in the long run is equal to the expected
long-run growth in book value of equity reduced by a factor (which is a function
of the persistence and the volatility in the growth in book value).
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Abstract
Based on US data, I study the total effect that accounting conservatism has on
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. I hypothesize that conservatism af-
fects this accuracy directly and indirectly via the effect that conservatism has on
the time-series properties of earnings. The results show that conservatism indi-
rectly and positively affects the absolute forecast errors and dispersion, because
conservatism increases earnings volatility. Furthermore, the results show that con-
servatism directly and positively inﬂuences the absolute forecast errors and dis-
persion, which indicates that either analysts do not correctly incorporate conser-
vatism into their forecasts or there are other factors (besides earnings volatility)
that mediate the relation between accounting conservatism and the accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The ﬁndings suggest that regulators should not only
consider the beneﬁts of accounting conservatism, namely, protecting investors
from future losses, but also the costs, in the form of higher earnings volatility and
lower accuracy of earnings forecasts.
Keywords: Path analysis, Accounting conservatism, Earnings volatility, Ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts.
JEL classiﬁcation: M41.
63
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on how the measurement of accounting earnings affects the
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. To analyze this relation, I address the
question whether accounting conservatism impedes analysts’ ability to accurately
forecast earnings. Two things might affect this: ﬁrst, analysts either take into ac-
count or fail to take into account conservatism when making their earnings fore-
casts; second, conservatism might change the time-series properties of earnings
(earnings volatility). Although the earlier literature (Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and
Thornton (2010) and Sohn (2012)) has studied the relation between conservatism
and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the ﬁndings have been inconsis-
tent. Those studies analyze the relation by using multiple regression, controlling
for, among other things, earnings volatility assuming that this is exogenous. This
assumption fails to capture the total effect of conservatism on forecast accuracy,
since conservatism might change the time-series characteristics of earnings.
Because ﬁnancial analysts are intermediaries for investors in the ﬁnancial market,
what affects the accuracy of their forecasts is of great importance: more efﬁcient
analysts’ earnings forecasts lead to a more efﬁcient allocation of capital in society.
If accounting principles systematically affect the accuracy of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, this means that policy decisions regarding accounting conservatism af-
fect the allocation of capital in society. As far as my knowledge extends, no other
study has looked at the total effect of conservatism on the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts.
To assess the total effect of conservatism on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, I estimate both the direct (analysts’ ability to take into account conser-
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vatism in their earnings forecasts1) and indirect effect (the changes in earnings
volatility because of conservatism). I hypothesize that conservatism increases
earnings volatility, since conservatism decreases the match between revenue and
expenses, which results in more volatile earnings. This is in contrast to earlier
studies (Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn (2012)), which
assume that earnings volatility is exogenous (and as a result, only study the direct
effect). I follow the literature by deﬁning accounting conservatism as a relative
understatement of book value (i.e. accounting conservatism exists when the mar-
ket value of an asset is larger than the book value). Conservatism is referred to as
unconditional (conditional) if it is independent (dependent) of the news (Beaver
and Ryan 2005). An example of unconditional conservatism is the use of a depre-
ciation scheme that is more accelerated than economic depreciation2. In contrast,
an asset write-down is an example of conditional conservatism, since it is depen-
dent on the news about the market value of that particular asset. I only focus on
unconditional conservatism, since analysts’ earnings forecasts generally exclude
the main part of the US GAAP transitory items (Gu and Chen 2004), which (in
this case) are the market value adjustments (i.e. news).
The results show that the direct effect of unconditional conservatism on the ac-
curacy of analysts’ forecasts (measured by the mean absolute forecast error and
the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts) is negative, suggesting that analysts either
over- or under-state conservatism in their forecasts. The results also show that the
indirect effect on analyst forecast accuracy is negatively related to unconditional
1Another conceivable explanation for a signiﬁcant direct effect is that there are other mediating factors that are not
modeled. Thus it is possible that a signiﬁcant direct effect arises simply because the model is too simpliﬁed. However,
in the rest of the paper I will refer to a signiﬁcant direct effect as a sign of analysts’ conservatism-adjustment failure.
2Depreciation of assets over a shorter period than the economically useful life of the assets normally also results
in depreciation that is more accelerated than economic depreciation.
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conservatism, because it increases earnings volatility. In sum, unconditional con-
servatism comes with a cost of decreased accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, because
of increased earnings volatility (indirect effect) and analysts’ failure to adjust for
conservatism (direct effect).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
In Section 3, I discuss the difference between unconditional and conditional con-
servatism. I develop hypotheses in Section 4. In Section 5, I present the research
design. Sections 5.3 and 6 describe the sample and the results. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Related research
The literature on the relation between accounting standards and the accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts3 can be divided into i) event studies and ii) level stud-
ies. Regarding the event studies, Brown (1983) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990)
study the relation between accounting changes and the accuracy of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts. Brown (1983) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990) analyze whether ac-
counting changes lead to a change in the performance of analysts’ earnings fore-
casts. Both Brown (1983) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990) ﬁnd that the accuracy
of analysts’ earnings forecasts (accuracy measures b) and d)) worsen when ac-
counting changes occur. However, as noted by Elliott and Philbrick (1990), when
accounting changes take place, analysts should not only forecast the real value
creation/destruction of the ﬁrm, but also the effect of the accounting changes. It
3Accuracy is measured in different ways in the literature. The four main measures of accuracy are: a)
(Mean/Median) Forecast Error; b) Absolute (Mean/Median) Forecast Error; c) Mean Absolute Forecast Error; d)
Standard Deviation of Forecast Error. Forecast error is the difference between the actual value and the forecast value.
Measure a) is also known as “forecast bias”. (For further details on forecast accuracy, see Section 5.2.1)
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will be more difﬁcult to forecast earnings when accounting changes have taken
place, regardless of whether a company switches from a more or less conservative
accounting method. Because of this, the ﬁndings of Brown (1983) and Elliott and
Philbrick (1990) can not be used to make inferences about whether the accuracy
of analysts’ earnings forecasts increases or decreases with more conservative ac-
counting methods.
The level studies follow two lines: one line of research studies the relation be-
tween earnings predictability and analysts’ forecasts; the second investigates the
relation between conservatism and analysts’ forecasts. With respect to the rela-
tion between earnings predictability and analysts’ forecasts, Das et al. (1998) ﬁnd
that lower earnings predictability leads to a more optimistic bias in analysts’ fore-
casts (i.e. lower predictability decreases accuracy measure ‘a’). Das et al. (1998)
attribute this to how analysts deal with high uncertainty. The argument is that
analysts issue optimistic forecasts to delight management and thereby get access
to management’s private information.
Earnings predictability (measured by the standard deviation of the residuals from
an AR1 model of earnings) are also used as a measure of earnings quality (Ecker
et al. (2006)), where a higher standard deviation of the residuals indicates a lower
earnings predictability. Ecker et al. (2006) develop a return-based measure of
earnings quality, which they refer to as “e-loading”. In the same way as beta
measures the sensitivity of individual ﬁrm return to market returns, “e-loading”
measures the sensitivity of individual ﬁrm returns to market (or industry) earnings
quality. Ecker et al. (2006) show that a higher e-loading (lower earnings quality)
increases forecast inaccuracy (measured as the absolute value of analysts’ fore-
casts bias and forecast dispersion), which is in line with the ﬁndings in Das et al.
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(1998). Eames and Glover (2003) argue that the ﬁndings in Das et al. (1998) can
be explained by the relation between earnings level and earnings predictability.
Eames and Glover (2003) ﬁnd that there does not exist a relation between earn-
ings predictability and analysts’ forecasts bias when the earnings level is used as
a control variable. This suggests that the variations in earnings level are largely
captured by the variation in earnings predictability and that the earnings level does
affect analysts’ forecasts bias, whereas earnings predictability does not.
The ﬁndings of Eames and Glover (2003) suggest there is no indirect (medi-
ated) effect of conservatism on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, since
earnings predictability does not result in analyst forecast bias. Nonetheless, even
though earnings predictability offers no information about analysts’ forecast bias
when controlling for earnings level, it is still likely that it conveys information
about the precision (accuracy measure c) or d)) of the forecasts. I discuss this
further in Section 4.2.2 and discuss the differences between these measures of ac-
curacy in Section 5.2.1.
Regarding the second line of research, Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton
(2010) and Sohn (2012) study how conservatism affects the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts. Using the C-score of Penman and Zhang (2002) (the estimated
reserve), Mensah et al. (2004) ﬁnd that higher unconditional conservatism leads to
higher absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion4. In another study, Pae and
Thornton (2010) look at unconditional and conditional conservatism simultane-
ously. Pae and Thornton (2010) ﬁnd a positive correlation between unconditional
4They also use two other measures of conservatism, based on accruals, to test the robustness of their result.
However, accrual based conservatism measures are also likely to capture conditional conservatism, since write-downs
are a part of total accruals. So these two measures are not likely to capture the same constructs as the estimated reserve.
68
conservatism (measured by both the market-to-book value and the estimated re-
serve) and earnings forecast errors (bias). Since forecast error is the difference
between the actual earnings and forecast earnings, this indicates that analysts are
more optimistic about ﬁrms with low unconditional conservatism. However, when
they control for other inﬂuential variables (including conditional conservatism5),
the positive relation between unconditional conservatism and earnings forecast
errors is no longer signiﬁcant. Pae and Thornton (2010) use multiple linear re-
gression and thereby assume that unconditional and conditional conservatism are
independent. This might be an issue, since unconditional conservatism precedes
conditional conservatism. In an additional study, Sohn (2012) uses six different
measures of conservatism, where two of them, the market-to-book ratio and the
change in the estimated reserve (the Penman and Zhang (2002) Q-score), cap-
ture unconditional conservatism. The study reveals that none of these widely
used conservatism measures are highly correlated (See the discussion in Section
5.2.2). Sohn (2012) ﬁnds no statically signiﬁcant difference in forecast errors be-
tween low and high conservatism ﬁrms, which is in line with Pae and Thornton
(2010). This suggests that analysts incorporate conservatism into their forecasts,
because (as Sohn (2012) points out) analysts’ signed forecast errors (accuracy
measure a)) are smaller for more conservative ﬁrms if earnings forecasts are not
reduced by the same amount as conservatism reduces earnings. Sohn (2012) also
analyzes the relation between the absolute forecast errors and conservatism and
ﬁnds that lower conservatism leads to higher absolute forecast errors, contradict-
ing the ﬁndings in Mensah et al. (2004) and the ﬁndings in the present paper.
The studies by Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn (2012)
have two things in common: they all use multiple regression in their analysis and
5Measured by Basu (1997)’s asymmetric timeliness measure
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they all use earnings volatility as a control variable. Equation 1 show a represen-
tative model for these studies.
|FE| = α + β1CONS + β2EARN V OL+
M∑
i=1
βi+2CONTROLi (1)
where |FE| is the absolute value of the forecast error; CONS is conservatism
(the variable of interest); EARN V OL is earnings volatility (a control variable);
and CONTROL1–CONTROLM are the control variables. If earnings volatility
is not exogenous but endogenous (because conservatism may affect the volatility
of earnings), these studies do not capture the full effect of conservatism on the
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Actually, Mensah et al. (2004) question
the exogeneity assumption about earnings predictability. In additional tests of this
relation, Mensah et al. (2004) conclude that earnings predictability is not affected
by conservatism. Nonetheless, Mensah et al. (2004) fail to treat earnings pre-
dictability as an exogenous variable, because the relation is tested by regressing
earnings predictability on conservatism (and earnings volatility). Since the mea-
sures of earnings predictability and earnings volatility are closely dependent (the
relation between these two measure are discussed in the Appendix A), Mensah
et al. (2004) again treat earnings predictability as an exogenous variable.
Unlike Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn (2012), I do not
assume the exogeneity of earnings volatility. I hypothesize that earnings volatility
is endogenously determined by unconditional conservatism. That is, the paper in-
vestigates both the direct effect of unconditional conservatism on the accuracy of
analysts’ forecasts (i.e. Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn
(2012)) and also the indirect effect that is mediated by earnings volatility.
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3 Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism
It is not obvious how unconditional and conditional conservatism are linked to
each other. In order to get further insight into how accounting conservatism (both
unconditional and conditional) affects the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, a brief
discussion of these two conservatism concepts follows.
Beaver and Ryan (2005) model the relation between unconditional conservatism
and conditional conservatism. They show that unconditional conservatism affects
conditional conservatism and that conditional conservatism affects future uncon-
ditional conservatism. The reason is that unconditional conservatism mitigates
the magnitude and the likelihood of conditional conservatism. Expensing R&D
and advertising is an example of “full” unconditional conservatism. This expens-
ing eliminates any possibility of future conditional conservatism, since they are
fully expensed and therefore can not be written down in the future.
Conditional conservatism affects future unconditional conservatism because it re-
sets the cost bases of the net assets. When conditional conservatism events take
place (e.g. an asset write-down to its market value), the subsequent unconditional
conservatism for those assets is equal to zero because the book values now equal
the market values of the assets. On a conceptual level, this is illustrated in Table
1, showing the relation between unconditional and conditional conservatism over
time. The table shows how expensing (immediate writeoffs) of investments af-
fects unconditional conservatism and hence the probability of future conditional
conservatism events. It further shows how a conditional conservatism event af-
fects future unconditional conservatism.
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In a related study, Gu and Chen (2004) examine how analysts treat nonrecur-
ring items (e.g. write-downs). Gu and Chen (2004) show that analysts are not
consistent in which nonrecurring items they exclude or include. However, ap-
proximately 85% of the total nonrecurring items are, on average, excluded. This
is in line with Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007), who show that I/B/E/S earnings
(also known as “Street” earnings) generally exclude nonrecurring items (such as
write-downs), other special items, and non-operating items from GAAP earn-
ings. Since approximately 85% of the non-recurring items are excluded from the
I/B/E/S earnings, analysts should only forecast around 15% of the non-recurring
items. So analysts’ earnings forecasts should only take into account about 15%
of the total conditional conservatism. Therefore I expect that the relation between
conditional conservatism and analysts’ forecast accuracy is insigniﬁcant. For that
reason, I only focus on unconditional conservatism in this paper.
4 Conservatism and the accuracy of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts
In this section I discuss and develop the hypotheses about how conservatism af-
fects the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
I hypothesize that unconditional conservatism affects analysts’ forecast accuracy
both directly and indirectly. In Figure 1, the total effect of conservatism on the
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is the sum of the direct effect and indirect effect.
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Figure 1: Path diagram showing the direct and indirect effects of con-
servatism on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Conservatism affects analysts’ forecast accuracy directly and indirectly. The indirect effects is me-
diated by earnings volatility.
The affect of conservatism on analysts’ forecast accuracy is partly mediated through
earnings volatility. Now, I address the direct and indirect effects in turn.
4.1 Direct effect
If the direct effect is not different from zero, this suggests that analysts correctly
incorporate conservatism into their earnings forecasts. As I do not focus on the
direction of the bias, a positive direct effect suggests that analysts either under-
state or overstate the effect that conservatism has on earnings. If the direct effect
is negative, this suggests that analysts are better at forecasting earnings for highly
conservative ﬁrms, since the unsigned forecast errors are smaller for highly con-
servative ﬁrms. Sohn (2012) points out that unconditional conservatism decreases
management’s opportunity to manage earnings. Less earnings management is
likely to decrease analysts’ earnings forecast errors, implying a negative rela-
tion between unconditional conservatism and analysts’ earnings forecast errors.
Therefore, if the direct effect is negative, it is likely that earnings management
(besides earnings volatility) mediates the effect of accounting conservatism on
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analysts’ earnings forecasts (see the discussion in Section 6.2.5). Thus I do not
have ex ante expectations about whether conservatism directly increases or de-
creases the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
4.2 Indirect effect
4.2.1 Conservatism and earnings volatility
As mentioned in Section 1, accounting conservatism is deﬁned as the understate-
ment of book value. Lev and Sougannis (1996) show that current R&D expenses
generate revenues around ﬁve to eight years in the future. Likewise, advertis-
ing costs are also very likely to generate future revenue. Therefore, expensing
R&D and advertising costs implies a poor match between revenue and costs. As
a poor match increases the volatility of earnings (Dichev and Tang (2008)), I ex-
pect accounting conservatism to result in more volatile earnings. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H1: Accounting conservatism increases earnings volatility
4.2.2 Earnings volatility and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts
Independent of the accounting scheme adopted by the ﬁrm, analysts’ earnings
forecast errors should be equal to zero if there is no uncertainty about the inputs
to the revenue and expense generating processes in the economy. However, in
an economy without uncertainty, accounting is irrelevant (with no informational
value). When uncertainty exists in the economy, accounting creates valuable in-
formation. Uncertainty arises from two sources: uncertainty about the future state
of the economy and aggregation uncertainty. Aggregation uncertainty stems from
the aggregation in the ﬁnancial reports. For example, aggregation uncertainty is
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induced in the forecasts of future depreciation/amortization expenses, since ana-
lysts do not have information about the book value of every single asset, estimated
remaining life, scrap-value, and how it is depreciated.
Because aggregation uncertainty eliminates the possibility of generating single
asset depreciation/amortization forecasts, I expect that analysts rely more strongly
on aggregate time-series based forecasts of expenses. Since more volatile aggre-
gate expenses are likely to lead to larger absolute errors in expense forecasts, I
expect that more volatile aggregate expenses increase analysts’ forecast errors.
So if the relation between earnings predictability and analyst forecast bias is in-
signiﬁcant (after controlling for the earnings level (Eames and Glover (2003))),
I still expect a positive relation between earnings volatility and analyst forecast
inaccuracy (measured by unsigned forecast bias and forecast dispersion). This
expectation is in line with the empirical ﬁndings in Mensah et al. (2004), Ecker
et al. (2006)6 and Sohn (2012). Mensah et al. (2004), Ecker et al. (2006) and Sohn
(2012) ﬁnd that earnings volatility increases absolute forecast error (and forecast
dispersion). Thus, I hypothesize as follows:
H2: Earnings volatility increases the inaccuracy of analysts’ forecasts
6Ecker et al. (2006) do not directly analyze the relation between earnings volatility and analyst forecast inaccuracy.
They study the relation between e-loading (a measure of earnings quality) and analyst forecast inaccuracy. They
show that higher e-loading increases analyst forecast inaccuracy. Furthermore, they show that e-loading is positively
correlated with earnings predictability. They measure earnings predictability as the standard deviation of the residuals
from an AR1 model of earnings, where a higher value indicates a lower earnings predictability. Because of its
deﬁnition, this measure of earnings predictability is very highly positively correlated with earnings variance. Thus
the ﬁndings in Ecker et al. (2006) suggest that higher earnings volatility increases analyst forecast inaccuracy.
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5 Research design
5.1 Path analysis
To analyze the total effect of unconditional conservatism on the accuracy of an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts, I use path analysis. Path analysis is a special case of
structural equation modeling (SEM). The difference between path analysis and
SEM is that path analysis assumes that all variables are measured without error,
whereas SEM allows latent variables, to account for measurement error. Path
analysis (SEM) divides the total effect into direct and indirect paths. The indirect
paths go through one or more mediating variables. For that reason, I use path
analysis to deduce the total effect of conservatism on the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts.
5.2 Measures
Forecast accuracy, unconditional conservatism, and all the control variables (ex-
cept ﬁrm size and analyst coverage) are scaled. I also scale earnings before esti-
mating the earnings volatility. As the scaling variable, I use Net Operating Assets
(NOA). Thus the measure of unconditional conservatism is deﬁned as the Pen-
man and Zhang (2002) C-score. All variables are logarithmically transformed to
reduce the (right) skewness of the distribution.
5.2.1 Forecast accuracy
According to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), accuracy
is a 2-dimensional measure of trueness and precision. Trueness and precision
are not interrelated constructs. Menditto et al. (2007) emphasize that trueness
and precision are functions of systematic and random errors, respectively. Large
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systematic errors mean low trueness, whereas large random errors imply low pre-
cision. A quantitative measure of trueness could be (absolute) bias. A quantitative
measure of precision could be, e.g., the standard deviation.
Studies of the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts mainly rely on four mea-
sures:
a) The mean of the (scaled) value of the earnings forecast error (MFE)
E[] =
1
N
N∑
j=1
j
b) The absolute value of MFE (AMFE)
|E[]| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
j
∣∣∣∣∣
c) The mean of the absolute (scaled) value of earnings forecast errors
(MAFE)
E[||] = 1
N
N∑
j=1
|j|
d) The standard deviation of the (scaled) earnings forecast errors (StdFE)
Std[] =
√
V ar[] =
√√√√√ 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
j − 1
N
N∑
k=1
k
)2
where j denotes the forecast error for analyst j. The forecast error is the dif-
ference between the actual value and the forecast value. Note that the standard
deviation of forecast errors is equal to the standard deviation of the forecasts (also
known as the forecast dispersion), because the actual value is the same for all
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analysts (the actual earnings are the same for all analysts). Further, note that mea-
sures a) and b) can be calculated when there is only one forecast7 and that the
mean value is sometimes replaced by the median for these two measures in the
literature.
In the ISO context, the ﬁrst two measures relate to the trueness construct, whereas
measures c) and d) capture the precision. In this paper, I use the unsigned bias
(i.e. measure b)) as a measure of untrueness because I do not focus on whether the
forecasts errors become higher or lower with more unconditional conservatism,
but on whether the forecasts get closer to the actual value. As a measure of im-
precision, I use the standard deviation of the (scaled) earnings forecast error (i.e.
d)). I only include ﬁrm–year observations in the imprecision sample if it has fore-
casts from at least ﬁve different analysts.
In I/B/E/S, analysts make explicit earnings forecasts two to three years ahead
and implicit forecasts about the average ﬁve-year earnings growth rate. In this
paper, I only focus on the shortest forecast horizon (i.e. forecasts one year ahead),
because the sample size decreases with the forecast horizon.
5.2.2 Unconditional Conservatism
Lara et al. (2009, p. 344) highlights the difﬁculties of measuring unconditional
conservatism:
“Measuring unconditional conservatism is not a simple task. Recent research
uses the market-to-book ratio (also a proxy for growth and risk), the C-Score
proposed by Penman and Zhang (2002), the intercept of the Basu (1997)
7This can actually also be done for measure c). However, when there is only one forecast, measures b) and c) are
the same.
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regression, or the bias component developed by Beaver and Ryan (2000) as
measures of unconditional conservatism.”
The use of the intercept from the Basu (1997) regression as a measure of un-
conditional conservatism is problematic in this paper as it does not yield yearly
unconditional conservatism measures at the ﬁrm level. The ﬁrm-level ﬁxed ef-
fects approach in Beaver and Ryan (2000) has the “same” problem.
Regarding the estimated reserve (C-score), the issue with this measure is that
it only looks at conservatism in relation to inventory and intangible assets (R&D
and advertising). However, unconditional conservatism also derives from the de-
preciation of tangible assets. The accounting depreciation expenses of tangible
assets may be higher than the economic depreciation expenses, which is also a
part of total unconditional conservatism. I refer to this part of unconditional con-
servatism as “depreciation conservatism”. McNichols et al. (2014) ﬁnds that the
the replacement costs of ﬁrms’ net assets is on average 1.865 (median 1.367)
higher than the book value8. Thus the estimated reserve ignores depreciation con-
servatism. Thereby the estimated reserve implicitly (and wrongly) assumes that
the depreciation schedule for assets chosen by the ﬁrm is equal to the economic
depreciation of these assets. Thus, the C-score suffers from errors in measure-
ment.
The market-to-book ratio includes depreciation conservatism. However, the
market-to-book ratio has another issue. The problem is that the markets for the
8This relative understatement of assets derives from both tangible and intangible assets (including R&D and
advertising expenses). However R&D and advertising only account for, on average, 23.4% (median 7.8%) of a ﬁrm’s
total capital expenditures. Thus it is very likely that, on average, the accounting depreciation expenses of tangible
assets are higher than the economic depreciation expenses
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ﬁrms’ net assets are incomplete. Empirically, some ﬁrms have market-to-book
ratios below one, indicating incomplete markets. If the markets for the ﬁrms’ net
assets are complete, then the market-to-book value for each ﬁrm is not below one,
since the accounting standards require a write-down of the assets to the market
value (i.e. fair value) and (as a result) the market-to-book ratio equals one.
Following Penman and Zhang (2002), I calculate the estimated R&D reserve and
advertising reserve by capitalizing the unamortized portion of the R&D and ad-
vertising expenses, using the industry amortization coefﬁcients estimated (by Lev
and Sougannis (1996)) for the R&D expenses and the sum-of-year’s digits method
over three years for the advertising expenses. In Section 6.2, I make robustness
checks where I use different assumptions to calculate the estimated reserve.
Results (untabulated) show that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the
Penman and Zhang (2002) estimated reserve and the market-to-book ratio is only
0.13 (0.17). However, these correlations are actually high compared to earlier
studies (Pae and Thornton (2010) and Sohn (2012)9). The correlations suggest
that the two conservatism measures, the estimated reserve and the market-to-book
ratio, are not very closely related. This might be explained by the fact that the
estimated reserve only reﬂects unconditional conservatism related to some oper-
ational activities whereas the market-to-book ratio reﬂects unconditional conser-
vatism related to both operational and ﬁnancial activities.
The unleveraged market-to-book ratio reﬂects only operational activities, as does
9The Pearson (Spearman), e.g., the correlations between the market-to-book ratio and the estimated reserve are
0.12 (0.002 and insigniﬁcant) in Pae and Thornton (2010). Sohn (2012) do not use the estimated reserve but the
Penman and Zhang (2002) Q-score, which is equal to the change in the estimated reserve. Therefore the correlation
in Sohn (2012) is even lower than in Pae and Thornton (2010).
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the estimated reserve. For this reason, I expect the unleveraged market-to-book to
be more highly correlated with the estimated reserve. Assuming that ﬁnancial as-
sets and ﬁnancial liabilities are measured at their market values, the unleveraged
market-to-book ratio is equal to
NOAMV
NOABV
=
NFOMV + EMV
NFOBV + EBV
≈ NFO
BV + EMV
NFOBV + EBV
where NOAMV , respectively, NOABV , denote the market, respectively, book
value of Net Operating Assets. NFOMV (NFOBV ) denotes the market (book)
value of Net Financial Obligations and EMV denotes the market value of equity.
NFOMV ≈ .NFOBV since most ﬁnancial assets and liabilities are measured at
fair value10. As expected, results (untabulated) show that the relation between
the estimated reserve and the unleveraged market-to-book ratio is closer than that
between the estimated reserve and the market-to-book ratio, yielding a Pearson
(Spearman) correlation of 0.4 (0.3). Even though the correlation between the
estimated reserve and the market-to-book ratio increases, because of the exclu-
sion/adjustment of ﬁnancial activities in the market-to-book ratio, the correlation
still seems a little low if these two measures are to capture the same underlying
construct.
McNichols et al. (2014) split the market-to-book ratio into a “future-to-book”
factor and a “conservatism correction” factor. The conservatism correction factor
comprises the replacement costs of the net assets deﬂated by their book value.
Empirically, McNichols et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the magnitude of the conservatism
10The unleveraged market-to-book is closely associated with the common practice estimate of Tobin’s Q (market
value deﬂated by book value of the total assets). The only difference is that the unleveraged market-to-book focuses
on Net Operating Assets, not on total assets
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correction factor is about two-thirds of the overall market-to-book ratio11.
Because one-third of the market-to-book ratio does not capture unconditional
conservatism, I only use the estimated reserve (Penman and Zhang (2002)) as
a measure of unconditional conservatism. The capitalization of R&D and adver-
tising is the main part of the estimated reserve in the sample. The LIFO reserve
accounts for only 9% of the estimated reserve12. The capitalization of R&D and
advertising is an estimate of the replacement costs of these assets deﬂated by the
book value of the net operating assets13.
5.2.3 Earnings Volatility
Earnings volatility is measured as the earnings variance, over the past ﬁve years.
Since the estimated level of unconditional conservatism is based on US GAAP
information, I expect a stronger relation between unconditional conservatism and
earnings volatility when earnings are measured using US GAAP than when using
the I/B/E/S earnings. Since unconditional conservatism emerges from operational
activities, I also expect a stronger effect of unconditional conservatism on earn-
ings volatility when EBIT is used as the earnings measure, than when net income
is used. EBIT is probably more closely related to I/B/E/S earnings than is net
income, because earnings in I/B/E/S exclude nonrecurring items, other special
items, and non-operating items from the GAAP earnings (Abarbanell and Lehavy
(2007)). For this reason, I use EBIT as the measure of earnings in the estimation
11McNichols et al. (2014) look at the adjusted market-to-book ratio. However, in this case, they only adjust for
ﬁnancial assets, not net ﬁnancial assets, as I do.
12Ranging from 0% to 34% in the industries using the one-digit SIC.
13The estimated reserve plus 1 is equal to the replacement costs of the net operating assets deﬂated by their relative
book values, assuming that the book values of net operating assets (excluding R&D and advertising costs) equal the
replacement costs of the net operating assets (excluding R&D and advertising).
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of the earnings volatility.
5.2.4 Controls
As mentioned in Section 2, Eames and Glover (2003) suggest that the effect of
earnings predictability on analysts’ forecast bias is captured by the earnings level.
To ensure that the effect of earnings volatility on analysts’ forecast accuracy is not
fully mediated through the earnings level, I control for the absolute earnings level.
I use the absolute level of earnings because the measure of analysts’ forecast ac-
curacy is an absolute measure as well. I therefore expect that higher absolute
levels of earnings results in less accuracy in analysts’ forecasts.
I control for market volatility to take into account changes in the macro-economic
environment. Market volatility is expected to be negatively related to analysts’
forecast accuracy.
Moreover, earlier literature (Mensah et al. (2004), Pae and Thornton (2010) and
Sohn (2012)) about analysts’ forecast bias/accuracy include ﬁrm size and the an-
alysts’ coverage as control variables. Following the literature, I measure ﬁrm size
by the market capitalization and analysts’ coverage as the number of analyst fore-
casts.
Lev (1983) analyzes the relation between earnings volatility (more speciﬁcally,
the volatility in Return On Equity) and different economic factors: product type,
entry barriers, ﬁrm size, and capital intensity. The product type is an indicator
variable that equals one if the industry is classiﬁed as a “durable goods produc-
ing industry” according to the Survey of Current Business, and zero otherwise.
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The ﬁndings in Lev (1983) suggest that ﬁrms in a non-durable goods producing
industry have (on average) less volatile earnings. Lev (1983) attributes this to
a smoother demand pattern for non-durable goods compared to that for durable
goods. Furthermore, Lev (1983) expects that having higher entry barriers is neg-
atively related to earnings volatility, because monopoly ﬁrms are less sensitive to
shocks in the economic and technological environments. However, this relation
is insigniﬁcant. With respect to ﬁrm size, Lev (1983) ﬁnds a negative association
between ﬁrm size and earnings volatility. Lev (1983) argues that larger ﬁrms seem
to have more stable growth patterns than do smaller ﬁrms. Lastly, Lev (1983) ar-
gues that capital intensity is positively related to earnings volatility. When capital
intensity is high, revenue and costs are less correlated in capital intensive ﬁrms
because capital intensity reﬂects the share of ﬁxed to total costs. However, this
relation is also empirically insigniﬁcant.
I include both ﬁrm size and capital intensity as controls for earnings volatility,
even though Lev (1983) ﬁnds it to be insigniﬁcant, since theory suggests this re-
lation. Capital intensity is likely to affect the level of unconditional conservatism,
since capital intensive ﬁrms often have higher R&D and advertising expenses.
Unconditional conservatism is also likely to be related to ﬁrm size, since larger
ﬁrms are more willing to invest more in R&D and advertising than smaller ﬁrms.
Therefore I also include capital intensity and ﬁrm size as a control variables for
unconditional conservatism. I do not include product type and entry barriers, as
these measures are industry speciﬁc; instead, I control for industry ﬁxed effects.
Furthermore, ﬁrm size and analysts’ coverage are likely highly correlated, since
larger ﬁrms are normally followed more closely. Hence I also include analysts’
coverage as control for earnings volatility and unconditional conservatism. Fi-
nally, I include the earnings level as control for earnings volatility and uncondi-
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tional conservatism, because, all else being equal, earnings volatility and the level
of the estimated reserve (i.e. unconditional conservatism) are proportional to the
earnings level.
5.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Analysts’ earnings forecasts are collected from the I/B/E/S database and the (ﬁrm-
level) accounting data from the Compustat database. The sample period is 1995–
2012. The US sample begins in 1995 because Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007)
show that a signiﬁcant shift in the mean earnings took place in the early 1990s. I
exclude regulated ﬁrms14 in the sample. To control for the inﬂuence of outliers, I
Winzorize the dependent variable and all the independent variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Finally, for each year, I require ﬁve preceding years of informa-
tion in order to calculate the earnings volatility.
Although all the variables are Winzorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, the re-
sults can still be affected by extreme values in the dependent variable, due to the
small denominator problem. Small forecast errors can be inﬂated (i.e. become
extreme values) because the scaling variables can be close to zero (even though
they are Winzorized). To deal with the small denominator problem, I follow the
approach of Lacina et al. (2011), and Winzorize the values of the scaled forecast
errors above one.
The sample size differs between the two measures of forecast accuracy (untrue-
ness and imprecision), because only one analyst forecast is required to calcu-
14Regulated ﬁrms are utilities and ﬁnancial institutions, which have SIC codes [4900–4999] and [6000–6999],
respectively
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late the Mean Absolute Forecast Error (MAFE), whereas to calculate the stan-
dard deviation of analysts’ forecasts (STD), at least three analyst forecasts are
required. Thus, using MAFE as the measure of forecast untrueness yields a
sample of 18,432 ﬁrm–year observations, which is larger than the sample size
of 15,566 ﬁrm–year observations obtained when STD is used as the measure of
forecast imprecision. Table 2 presents the distribution of the unconditional con-
servatism, earnings volatility, analysts’ forecast accuracy, and control variables,
when MAFE is used as the forecast accuracy measure.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (FI (MAFE))
Variable Mean Std Dev 0% Min 10% 25% Q1 50% Median 75% Q3 90% 100% Max
ABS ST EARN 4.675 2.100 -1.663 2.753 3.732 4.538 5.334 6.324 16.553
CI -2.230 0.659 -3.894 -2.974 -2.630 -2.276 -1.897 -1.451 0.565
FI 3.125 2.509 -4.003 0.427 1.658 2.957 4.253 5.665 15.244
SIZE 6.567 1.914 1.725 4.152 5.231 6.444 7.832 9.145 11.886
VAR EARN -5.002 2.569 -10.40 -7.914 -6.778 -5.341 -3.609 -1.774 5.284
EST RES -2.029 1.712 -7.002 -4.307 -3.071 -1.917 -0.861 0.025 2.815
VOL MARKET 3.009 0.393 2.279 2.452 2.718 3.025 3.247 3.531 4.419
NUM ANALYST 1.655 0.985 0.000 0.000 1.099 1.792 2.398 2.944 3.584
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm. All variables are scaled by Net Operating Assets (NOA) except SIZE
and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
Since all variables take strictly positive values, it seems odd that the minimum
values of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings, capital intensity, forecast
accuracy, earnings variance and the estimated reserve are negative. Nonetheless,
a negative value simply indicates that the value is below one, since all the variables
are logarithmically transformed to reduce skewness, as mentioned in Section 5.2.
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Table 3 presents the distribution of the unconditional conservatism, earnings volatil-
ity, analysts’ forecast accuracy, and control variables, for the sample where STD
is used as the forecast accuracy measure.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (FI (STD))
Variable Mean Std Dev 0% Min 10% 25% Q1 50% Median 75% Q3 90% 100% Max
ABS ST EARN 4.674 2.009 -1.663 2.835 3.789 4.557 5.319 6.225 17.099
CI -2.225 0.650 -3.868 -2.952 -2.625 -2.272 -1.897 -1.455 0.529
SIZE 6.929 1.807 2.402 4.680 5.679 6.788 8.105 9.351 11.926
VAR EARN -5.073 2.576 -10.55 -7.990 -6.853 -5.408 -3.687 -1.835 5.343
EST RES -2.033 1.711 -7.002 -4.308 -3.082 -1.910 -0.864 0.003 2.522
VOL MARKET 3.007 0.398 2.279 2.452 2.717 3.022 3.247 3.537 4.419
NUM ANALYST 1.946 0.775 0.693 0.693 1.386 1.946 2.565 2.996 3.611
FI 12.792 2.539 3.614 10.054 11.240 12.592 14.063 15.559 27.373
FI (STD) is the logarithm of the standard deviation of the individual analysts’ earnings forecasts.
ABS ST EARN is the logarithm of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm
of the depreciation expenses. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the
logarithm of the variance of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score
from Penman and Zhang (2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the
logarithm of the number of analysts covering the ﬁrm. All variables are scaled by Net Operating
Assets (NOA) except SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
The sample distribution (over time) appears in Tables 4 and 5. Table 5 shows that
the forecast imprecision sample has a higher average number of analysts who are
following each ﬁrm (i.e. analysts’ coverage), compared to the forecast untrueness
sample (i.e. Table 4). This is because a larger number of analysts’ forecasts are
required to calculate the forecast imprecision than to calculate the forecast un-
trueness (as mentioned above). The higher average number of analysts following
each ﬁrm is also reﬂected in a higher average ﬁrm size. The imprecision sample
also has lower earnings volatility. This could be explained by the fact that larger
ﬁrms are in the more mature part of the business lifecycle, where earnings are
more constant. In contrast, smaller ﬁrms are more likely to be in a growth phase
of the business cycle. Growth ﬁrms invest more, which can be observed in the
88
higher capital intensity in the precision sample. Over time, the samples do not
show signs of large differences.
Table 4: Sample Characteristics over time (FI (MAFE))
Year No. Obs. FI ABS ST EARN VOL MARKET SIZE NUM ANALYST EST RES VAR EARN CI
1995 1021 2.641 4.388 2.507 6.075 1.629 -2.089 -5.448 -2.210
1996 1022 2.916 4.485 2.744 6.110 1.593 -2.060 -5.320 -2.235
1997 1162 2.933 4.617 3.023 6.170 1.565 -2.137 -5.318 -2.243
1998 1123 3.173 4.651 3.106 6.172 1.566 -2.204 -5.307 -2.238
1999 1076 3.112 4.697 3.359 6.348 1.628 -2.177 -5.256 -2.216
2000 1071 3.216 4.728 3.211 6.372 1.643 -2.114 -5.034 -2.146
2001 1061 3.554 4.593 3.237 6.493 1.556 -2.073 -4.928 -2.131
2002 1000 3.094 4.480 3.213 6.557 1.566 -2.034 -5.029 -2.204
2003 1075 2.847 4.497 3.506 6.793 1.614 -2.038 -4.998 -2.217
2004 1168 2.915 4.605 2.915 6.962 1.644 -2.007 -4.901 -2.290
2005 1115 3.027 4.699 2.614 6.880 1.668 -2.015 -4.968 -2.311
2006 1081 2.953 4.739 2.452 6.990 1.660 -2.032 -5.008 -2.340
2007 1063 3.058 4.778 2.478 6.951 1.728 -2.046 -4.902 -2.328
2008 1030 3.461 4.864 3.192 6.306 1.695 -1.973 -4.933 -2.181
2009 900 3.626 4.744 3.701 6.639 1.675 -1.805 -4.704 -2.130
2010 819 3.637 5.004 3.064 6.813 1.730 -1.746 -4.529 -2.170
2011 807 3.221 4.849 2.974 6.790 1.850 -1.876 -4.509 -2.265
2012 838 3.117 4.898 2.985 6.948 1.905 -1.919 -4.563 -2.260
Total 18,432 3.125 4.675 3.009 6.567 1.655 -2.029 -5.002 -2.230
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm. All variables are scaled by Net Operating Assets (NOA) except SIZE
and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
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Table 5: Sample Characteristics over time (FI (STD))
Year No. Obs. FI ABS ST EARN VOL MARKET SIZE NUM ANALYST EST RES VAR EARN CI
1995 812 11.935 4.377 2.506 6.502 1.992 -2.126 -5.555 -2.189
1996 815 12.024 4.385 2.747 6.529 1.944 -2.081 -5.442 -2.231
1997 949 12.250 4.587 3.023 6.558 1.888 -2.140 -5.419 -2.237
1998 908 12.342 4.643 3.103 6.590 1.883 -2.236 -5.464 -2.230
1999 874 12.544 4.658 3.368 6.796 1.960 -2.233 -5.445 -2.208
2000 869 12.531 4.646 3.210 6.840 1.962 -2.174 -5.193 -2.161
2001 836 12.791 4.599 3.226 6.980 1.907 -2.104 -4.985 -2.136
2002 821 13.006 4.490 3.215 6.983 1.890 -2.048 -5.072 -2.194
2003 911 12.783 4.525 3.509 7.112 1.883 -2.051 -5.081 -2.222
2004 989 12.753 4.562 2.914 7.304 1.949 -2.017 -4.989 -2.272
2005 951 12.825 4.675 2.610 7.201 1.963 -2.001 -4.988 -2.311
2006 959 12.883 4.748 2.455 7.272 1.904 -1.997 -5.043 -2.329
2007 945 12.961 4.754 2.466 7.218 1.953 -2.019 -4.982 -2.316
2008 913 13.116 4.818 3.196 6.613 1.930 -1.967 -5.004 -2.167
2009 771 13.705 4.844 3.717 6.934 1.963 -1.747 -4.700 -2.132
2010 722 13.506 5.091 3.066 7.076 1.972 -1.762 -4.582 -2.175
2011 740 13.277 4.959 2.966 6.986 2.052 -1.866 -4.526 -2.247
2012 781 13.317 4.878 2.987 7.160 2.083 -1.916 -4.626 -2.244
Total 15,566 12.792 4.674 3.007 6.929 1.946 -2.033 -5.073 -2.225
FI (STD) is the logarithm of the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts.
ABS ST EARN is the logarithm of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm
of the depreciation expenses. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the
logarithm of the variance of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score
from Penman and Zhang (2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the
logarithm of the number of analysts covering the ﬁrm. All variables are scaled by Net Operating
Assets (NOA) except SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
6 Results
I estimate the model using maximum likelihood estimation. As mentioned in
Section 5.2.4, I include industry ﬁxed effects (market volatility) to control for the
cross-sectional (time-series) clustering of errors. The estimated model is depicted
in ﬁgure 2.
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6.1 Overall results
Table 6 shows the results of the effect of unconditional conservatism on analysts’
forecast inaccuracy (measured by forecast untrueness and imprecision).
Table 6: Direct and indirect effects of unconditional conservatism on
forecast untrueness and imprecision. Scaling variable: NOA
Effect Path from Path to
Trueness (MAFE) Precision (STD)
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Total EST RES FI 0.0771*** 15.27 0.1117*** 20.14
Direct EST RES FI 0.0128** 2.33 0.0435*** 7.28
Mediated . .
Direct EST RES VAR EARN 0.4019*** 60.12 0.3984*** 54.25
Direct VAR EARN FI 0.1601*** 29.86 0.1712*** 29.45
Indirect EST RES FI 0.0644*** 26.47 0.0682*** 25.64
Controls . .
Direct ABS ST EARN FI 0.7092*** 183.47 0.6454*** 145.64
Direct VOL MARKET FI 0.0375*** 8.82 0.0527*** 11.45
Direct NUM ANALYST FI 0.0403*** 6.23 0.1321*** 19.47
Direct SIZE FI -0.2716*** -40.57 0.2107*** 30.29
Direct ABS ST EARN EST RES 0.2077*** 33.63 0.2135*** 31.95
Direct CI EST RES 0.2791*** 45.07 0.2741*** 40.95
Direct NUM ANALYST EST RES 0.0613*** 6.64 0.0751*** 7.81
Direct SIZE EST RES -0.0242*** -2.6 -0.0357*** -3.68
Direct ABS ST EARN VAR EARN 0.1618*** 26.59 0.1614*** 24.27
Direct CI VAR EARN 0.1583*** 25.15 0.1676*** 24.52
Direct NUM ANALYST VAR EARN 0.0557*** 6.34 0.0559*** 6.05
Direct SIZE VAR EARN -0.2068*** -23.47 -0.2040*** -22.06
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The table presents the direct,
indirect and the total effect from unconditional conservatism on forecast inaccuracy. Furthermore
the table presents the path coefﬁcients for the control variables as well. All variables are scaled by
Net Operating Assets (NOA) except SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. FI (STD) is the logarithm of
the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm.
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The total correlation is 0.08 (0.11) for forecast untrueness (imprecision). The to-
tal correlation is then divided into a direct effect and an indirect effect, where the
latter is mediated through earnings volatility. The direct effect is positive (0.01 for
forecast untrueness and 0.04 for forecast imprecision), indicating that analysts do
not correctly incorporate conservatism into their forecasts. For more uncondition-
ally conservative ﬁrms, analysts are either too optimistic or too pessimistic about
future earnings. The effect of unconditional conservatism on earnings volatility
is positive (0.40 for both forecast untrueness and imprecision), indicating that un-
conditional conservatism increases earnings volatility. The coefﬁcient between
the earnings volatility and the inaccuracy of the analysts’ forecasts is also pos-
itive (0.16 for forecast untrueness and 0.17 for forecast imprecision), indicating
that higher earnings volatility increases the inaccuracy. Overall, the total indi-
rect effect (the relation between unconditional conservatism and analysts’ fore-
cast inaccuracy) is therefore also positive (0.06 for forecast untrueness and 0.07
for forecast imprecision). In short (and as expected/hypothesized), the results
indicate that unconditional conservatism increases earnings volatility and (as a
result) increases analysts’ forecast inaccuracy. Furthermore, the results indicate
that the indirect effect is the strongest. The indirect effect accounts for approx-
imately 84% (61%) of the total correlation between unconditional conservatism
and analysts’ forecast untrueness (imprecision). However the t-statistics for all
the other parameter estimates are high as well, which suggests there might still
exist a clustering of the errors.
The path coefﬁcients for the control variables in Table 6 have the expected signs
except for the path from ﬁrm size to forecast inaccuracy, which is negative when
forecast untrueness is used as the inaccuracy measure. This suggests that for
larger ﬁrms, analysts’ forecasts are closer to the actual value, but more imprecise
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(analysts disagree more about their forecasts) than with smaller ﬁrms.
6.2 Additional analyses
6.2.1 Deﬂator
The variables in Table 6 were scaled by a book-value-based deﬂater (Net Oper-
ating Assets). I also estimate the model using a market-based deﬂater (Market
Value of Equity). The path coefﬁcient from estimating the model when variables
are scaled by market value of equity is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Direct and indirect effects of unconditional conservatism on
forecast untrueness and imprecision. Scaling variable: MVE
Effect Path from Path to
Trueness (MAFE) Precision (STD)
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Total EST RES FI 0.0808*** 16.19 0.1367*** 23.72
Direct EST RES FI 0.0650*** 12.4 0.1167*** 19.4
Mediated . .
Direct EST RES VAR EARN 0.1761*** 27.32 0.1748*** 24.71
Direct VAR EARN FI 0.0897*** 16.79 0.1144*** 18.94
Indirect EST RES FI 0.0158*** 14.29 0.0200*** 15.02
Controls . .
Direct ABS ST EARN FI 0.6849*** 184.14 0.6897*** 159.61
Direct VOL MARKET FI 0.0357*** 8.07 0.0521*** 10.27
Direct NUM ANALYST FI 0.0650*** 9.51 0.1690*** 22.38
Direct SIZE FI -0.2872*** -39.98 0.2382*** 30.2
Direct ABS ST EARN EST RES 0.0285*** 4.45 0.0276*** 3.96
Direct CI EST RES 0.4173*** 63.62 0.4065*** 56.56
Direct NUM ANALYST EST RES 0.0985*** 10.25 0.1096*** 10.89
Direct SIZE EST RES -0.1787*** -17.92 -0.1807*** -17.34
Direct ABS ST EARN VAR EARN 0.0051 0.92 0.0086 1.42
Direct CI VAR EARN 0.5020*** 82.6 0.5137*** 77.83
Direct NUM ANALYST VAR EARN -0.1164*** -14 -0.0971*** -11.04
Direct SIZE VAR EARN -0.1141*** -13.12 -0.1022*** -11.14
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The table presents the direct,
indirect and the total effect from unconditional conservatism on forecast inaccuracy. Furthermore
the table presents the path coefﬁcients for the control variables as well. All variables are scaled by
Market Value of Equity (MVE) except SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
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FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. FI (STD) is the logarithm of
the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm.
Scaling by market value of equity (Table 7) yields similar results as when the
variables are scaled by net operating assets (Table 6), but differs slightly in two
aspects. First, the relative importance of the direct and the indirect effects seems
to change. In Table 7 the direct effect seem to be the strongest, whereas in Ta-
ble 6 it seems to be the indirect effect. Second, in Table 7 the control variable
“analysts’ coverage” is negatively related to the estimated reserve (unconditional
conservatism), whereas it is positive in Table 6.
6.2.2 Other estimation assumptions about the estimated reserve
I also estimate the R&D reserve assuming that the R&D asset life is ﬁve years and
use two different amortization methods: linear amortization and sum-of-year’s
digits amortization. In addition, I calculate the estimated advertising reserve us-
ing linear amortization and sum-of-year’s digits amortization, assuming a three
year life period for advertising expenses. This gives four other estimates of the
estimated reserve. These four new measures of the estimated reserve yield similar
results.
6.2.3 R&D and advertising expenses
An alternative explanation of the ﬁndings in Table 6 are that the results are driven
by companies that invest in R&D and/or advertising, since the estimated reserve
primarily consists of capitalized R&D and/or advertising costs. Since compa-
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nies that invest heavily in R&D or advertising are more difﬁcult to forecast, it
might not be conservatism but the difﬁculty in forecasting the revenue generation
from R&D or advertising expenses that is driving the results. To test this alter-
native hypothesis, I exclude all ﬁrms that have R&D and/or advertising estimated
reserves. The remaining ﬁrms either have no LIFO reserves (and hence no esti-
mated reserves) or are ﬁrms that have LIFO reserves. Table 8 shows the effect
of unconditional conservatism on analysts’ forecast inaccuracy when ﬁrm–years
with positive capitalized R&D and/or advertising costs are excluded. The results
are similar to the results in Table 6 except that the direct effect now become in-
signiﬁcant.
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Table 8: Direct and indirect effects of unconditional conservatism on
forecast untrueness and imprecision when ﬁrm–years with positive
capitalized R&D and/or advertising costs are excluded. Scaling vari-
able: NOA
Effect Path from Path to
Trueness (MAFE) Precision (STD)
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Total EST RES FI 0.1008*** 3.49 0.0864*** 3.31
Direct EST RES FI 0.0187 0.66 0.0130 0.51
Mediated . .
Direct EST RES VAR EARN 0.2686*** 8.74 0.2692*** 8.22
Direct VAR EARN FI 0.3054*** 11.26 0.2729*** 10.69
Indirect EST RES FI 0.0820*** 6.8 0.0735*** 6.41
Controls . .
Direct ABS ST EARN FI 0.4960*** 20.47 0.4070*** 17.03
Direct VOL MARKET FI 0.0417 1.62 0.0802*** 3.43
Direct NUM ANALYST FI 0.1617*** 4.39 0.1789*** 5.39
Direct SIZE FI -0.2776*** -7.56 0.3275*** 9.91
Direct ABS ST EARN EST RES 0.0302 0.95 0.0535 1.52
Direct CI EST RES 0.0344 1.06 0.0467 1.3
Direct NUM ANALYST EST RES -0.1561*** -3.57 -0.0838* -1.76
Direct SIZE EST RES 0.0760* 1.71 0.0542 1.12
Direct ABS ST EARN VAR EARN 0.0705** 2.31 0.0648* 1.96
Direct CI VAR EARN 0.1832*** 5.9 0.1918*** 5.72
Direct NUM ANALYST VAR EARN 0.1141*** 2.68 0.2280*** 5.12
Direct SIZE VAR EARN -0.0834* -1.94 -0.1262*** -2.76
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The table presents the
direct, indirect and the total effect from unconditional conservatism on forecast inaccuracy when
ﬁrm–years with positive capitalized R&D and/or advertising costs are excluded (i.e. positive un-
conditional conservatism can only stem from the LIFO reserve.). Furthermore the table presents the
path coefﬁcients for the control variables as well. All variables are scaled by Net Operating Assets
(NOA) except SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. FI (STD) is the logarithm of
the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm.
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6.2.4 Bidirectional causality
Even though I argued that it is likely that unconditional conservatism affects earn-
ings volatility (see section 4.2.1), it is also conceivable that earnings volatility af-
fects unconditional conservatism (i.e. the causality direction might be reversed or
bidirectional). This is because ﬁrms operating in a highly volatile business envi-
ronment (and therefore having highly volatile earnings15) also have a high level
of conservatism (i.e. high R&D and advertising costs).
I test for simultaneity and bi-directional causality by reestimating the model de-
picted in ﬁgure 2 as a non-recursive model16. I do this by including an extra (or
“reverse”) path from earnings volatility to conservatism. Thus, a bidirectional
feedback loop now exists between conservatism and earnings volatility. The non-
recursive model is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
A non-recursive model, unlike a recursive model, is not always identiﬁed. Identi-
ﬁcation means that there exists a unique solution for the model parameters. One
necessary (sufﬁcient) condition for the model to be identiﬁed is that it satisﬁes
the order (rank) condition. Since the model is block recursive (i.e. the effects
from earnings and conservatism are direct effects on forecast accuracy), the order
(rank) condition should be evaluated separately for each block (Kline (2011, pp.
135, 151–153)). Since recursive models are always identiﬁed, so is the recursive
block. In order for the non-recursive block to fulﬁll the necessary condition for
identiﬁcation, the order condition says that earnings volatility must have at least
one (2-1=1) explanatory variable that is not used as an explanatory variable for
15In a highly volatile business environment the revenue as well as the costs are highly volatile.
16A non-recursive model is a model that includes a feedback loop. A model that does not include one or more
feedback loops is named a recursive model.
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conservatism and vice versa. Furthermore, when this holds, it is easily veriﬁed
(using the approach from Kline (2011, pp. 151–153)) that the rank condition is
satisﬁed, and hence the model is theoretically identiﬁed.
Empirical correlations (untabulated) show that, even though ﬁrm size seems to be
signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with both earnings volatility and conservatism,
the correlation between ﬁrm size and conservatism is much lower (-0.02) com-
pared to the correlation between ﬁrm size and earnings volatility (-0.17). There-
fore, I exclude ﬁrm size as an explanatory variable for conservatism.
Qiang (2007) shows that higher litigation, regulation and tax costs increase uncon-
ditional conservatism17. Thus including either litigation, regulation or tax costs
(or all of them) as explanatory variable(s) for conservatism would make the model
theoretically identiﬁed since ﬁrm size is only used as explanatory variable for
earnings volatility. However, Qiang (2007) assumes that the company has the
opportunity to choose whether or not to understate the book value of the assets.
With regard to the measure of unconditional conservatism used in this paper (i.e.
the estimated reserve) the company does not have a choice whether or not to un-
derstate the value of the R&D and advertising assets since the accounting rules
require these assets to be set to zero (i.e. the largest possible understatement).
Even though the company can choose its inventory valuation method and there-
17Following Qiang (2007) I measure litigation costs as a binary variable that equals one if the company is audited
by a big-four (earlier big-eight) company and zero otherwise. Regulation costs are measured as a binary variable
that equals one if sales deﬂated by industry sales divided by the number of ﬁrms within the industry (based on a
two-digit SIC code) is in the top quartile and zero otherwise. Taxation costs are measured as the parameter estimate
for tax expense from a regression of tax expense minus deferred tax expense on tax expense (where all variables are
deﬂated by lagged total assets). Qiang (2007) estimates the regression over the whole sample period, which generates
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimate of taxation costs. I use a ﬁrm–year speciﬁc taxation costs estimate by only estimating over
the same 5-year period as when estimating the earnings volatility.
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fore has a choice about the last part of the estimated reserve (the LIFO reserve
part), this part accounts for only 9% (see section 5.2.2) of the total estimated re-
serve. Thus the determinant factors of unconditional conservatism explored in
Qiang (2007) will not likely be signiﬁcant determinant factors of the estimated
reserve. Empirical correlations (untabulated) show that taxation costs are not sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the estimated reserve, but that litigation costs and regu-
lation costs are. Nonetheless these correlations are low (0.02 for litigation costs
and -0.03 for regulation costs18). Therefore, (because of these low correlations)
if only litigation costs and regulation costs are included as explanatory variables,
the model is likely not empirically identiﬁed. Because of that, I also include the
level of R&D expenses19 (undeﬂated and logarithm transformed). To test that the
model is empirically identiﬁed, I use different initial values and observe that the
model converges to the same solution (Kline (2011, p. 233)). When estimating
the model with R&D expenses, litigation costs and regulation costs as explanatory
variables for conservatism the model is empirically unidentiﬁed. This is because
regulation costs are highly correlated with ﬁrm size, and therefore the order and
rank condition for earnings volatility is not empirically satisﬁed. Hence, I rees-
timate the model when only R&D expenses and litigation costs are included as
explanatory variables for conservatism. The results are reported in table 9.
The table shows that there seems to be a bi-directional cause and effect from
conservatism on earnings volatility. The effect from conservatism on earnings
volatility is approximately 1.4 times larger than the effect from earnings volatility
on conservatism.
18The correlation of -0.03 between regulation costs and conservatism contradicts the predictions and ﬁndings in
Qiang (2007).
19The advertising expenses are not signiﬁcantly correlated with the estimated reserve.
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Table 9: Direct and indirect effects of unconditional conservatism
on forecast untrueness and imprecision with bidirectional effects be-
tween unconditional conservatism and earnings volatility. Scaling
variable: NOA
Effect Path from Path to
Trueness (MAFE) Precision (STD)
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Total EST RES FI 0.0529*** 9.04 0.0869*** 13.39
Direct EST RES FI 0.0123** 2.24 0.0430*** 7.2
Mediated . .
Direct VAR EARN EST RES 0.1669*** 13.05 0.1649*** 11.59
Direct EST RES VAR EARN 0.2403*** 15.81 0.2370*** 13.95
Direct VAR EARN FI 0.1600*** 29.84 0.1705*** 29.39
Indirect EST RES FI 0.0406*** 14.33 0.0438*** 13.29
Controls . .
Direct ABS ST EARN FI 0.7098*** 183.72 0.6453*** 145.68
Direct VOL MARKET FI 0.0375*** 8.82 0.0527*** 11.45
Direct NUM ANALYST FI 0.0404*** 6.24 0.1321*** 19.53
Direct SIZE FI -0.2719*** -40.48 0.2104*** 30.2
Direct ABS ST EARN EST RES 0.1575*** 26.09 0.1622*** 24.52
Direct CI EST RES 0.1980*** 30.98 0.1962*** 27.74
Direct NUM ANALYST EST RES -0.0061 -1.12 0.0051 0.87
Direct LIT COSTS EST RES 0.0138*** 2.62 0.0023 0.4
Direct SIZE R&D EST RES 0.4643*** 71.99 0.4570*** 64.06
Direct ABS ST EARN VAR EARN 0.1957*** 29.06 0.1962*** 26.44
Direct CI VAR EARN 0.2047*** 27.55 0.2133*** 26.3
Direct NUM ANALYST VAR EARN 0.0659*** 7.39 0.0683*** 7.29
Direct SIZE VAR EARN -0.2107*** -23.42 -0.2096*** -22.21
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The table presents the direct,
indirect and the total effect from unconditional conservatism on forecast inaccuracy. Furthermore
the table presents the path coefﬁcients for the control variables as well. All variables are scaled by
Net Operating Assets (NOA) except SIZE, NUM ANALYST, SIZE R&D and LIT COSTS, which
are unscaled.
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. FI (STD) is the logarithm of
the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm. LIT COSTS is a binary variable that equals one if the company is
audited by a big-four (earlier big-eight) company and zero otherwise. SIZE R&D is the logarithm
of the R&D expenses.
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6.2.5 Earnings management
Burgsthaler and Eames (2006) ﬁnd that earnings are managed to meet (or beat
by a small amount) analysts’ forecasts. Since unconditional conservatism de-
creases management’s opportunity to manage earnings, it is likely that uncon-
ditional conservatism decreases analysts’ earnings forecast errors through earn-
ings management (as the mediator). However, “big bath” earnings management
probably creates huge analysts’ earnings forecast errors. Therefore it is not obvi-
ous whether the effect of conservatism on analysts’ forecast accuracy is mediated
through earnings management or not. Thus, I repeat the analysis by including
earnings management in the estimation of the effect of conservatism on analysts’
forecast accuracy. The model is depicted in Figure 4.
The level of earnings management is measured by the level of discretionary accru-
als (the modiﬁed Jones model (Dechow et al. (1995))). Since the (modiﬁed) Jones
model estimates discretionary accruals scaled by total assets, I remove the scal-
ing by multiplying by total assets. Then I rescale it according to the scaling used
for the other variables. I include ﬁrm size and the analysts’ coverage as control
variables for earnings management, since larger and more closely covered ﬁrms
are monitored more closely than smaller ﬁrms, which reduces the opportunity for
engaging in earnings management. Table 10 shows that the inclusion of earnings
management as a mediator does not change the overall results. However, the re-
sults reveal that the effect of unconditional conservatism on earnings management
is positive, which contradicts the predictions. It also reveals that more earnings
management is associated with a lower inaccuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
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Table 10: Direct and indirect effects of unconditional conservatism
on forecast untrueness and imprecision when earnings management
is included as extra mediating variable. Scaling variable: NOA
Effect Path from Path to
Trueness (MAFE) Precision (STD)
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Total EST RES FI 0.0768*** 15.16 0.1101*** 19.77
Direct EST RES FI 0.0150*** 2.68 0.0468*** 7.67
Mediated . .
Direct EST RES VAR EARN 0.3978*** 58.93 0.3948*** 53.24
Direct VAR EARN FI 0.1592*** 29.5 0.1692*** 28.85
Direct EST RES ABS DA 0.2124*** 29.39 0.2105*** 26.24
Direct ABS DA FI -0.0071 -1.47 -0.0165*** -3.2
Indirect EST RES FI 0.0619*** 23.49 0.0633*** 22.04
Controls . .
Direct ABS ST EARN FI 0.7128*** 183.81 0.6519*** 146.95
Direct VOL MARKET FI 0.0365*** 8.54 0.0517*** 11.18
Direct NUM ANALYST FI 0.0388*** 5.97 0.1295*** 18.99
Direct SIZE FI -0.2760*** -39.53 0.1985*** 27.38
Direct ABS ST EARN EST RES 0.2020*** 32.29 0.2101*** 31.05
Direct CI EST RES 0.2860*** 45.72 0.2808*** 41.52
Direct NUM ANALYST EST RES 0.0593*** 6.35 0.0732*** 7.53
Direct SIZE EST RES -0.0165* -1.75 -0.0286*** -2.92
Direct ABS ST EARN VAR EARN 0.1581*** 25.77 0.1589*** 23.71
Direct CI VAR EARN 0.1652*** 25.97 0.1745*** 25.29
Direct NUM ANALYST VAR EARN 0.0550*** 6.21 0.0526*** 5.66
Direct SIZE VAR EARN -0.2046*** -23.02 -0.2007*** -21.54
Direct NUM ANALYST ABS DA -0.0544*** -5.42 -0.0465*** -4.36
Direct SIZE ABS DA -0.3826*** -39.13 -0.3715*** -35.79
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The table presents the
direct, indirect and the total effect from unconditional conservatism on forecast inaccuracy when
earnings management also mediates this effect. Furthermore the table presents the path coefﬁcients
for the control variables as well. All variables are scaled by Net Operating Assets (NOA) except
SIZE and NUM ANALYST, which are unscaled.
FI (MAFE) is the logarithm of the mean absolute forecast error. FI (STD) is the logarithm of
the standard deviation of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. ABS DA is the absolute abnor-
mal accruals from the modiﬁed Jones model (rescaled by NOA). ABS ST EARN is the logarithm
of the absolute value of the “Street” Earnings. CI is the logarithm of the depreciation expenses.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. VAR EARN is the logarithm of the variance
of the past ﬁve years of EBIT. EST RES is the logarithm of the C-Score from Penman and Zhang
(2002). VOL MARKET is the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
of the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility. NUM ANALYST is the logarithm of the number
of analysts covering the ﬁrm.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has studied how the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts are af-
fected by unconditional conservatism. I ﬁnd that the accuracy of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts is negatively related to unconditional conservatism. This relation
derives from a direct negative effect of unconditional conservatism on the ac-
curacy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, suggesting that analysts do not correctly
incorporate unconditional conservatism.
Further, I ﬁnd that unconditional conservatism affects the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts indirectly, through earnings volatility. Unconditional conser-
vatism increases earnings volatility, which decreases the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts.
Additional analyses reveal that the results are not explained by a high intensity
of investment in R&D and advertising. Furthermore, these analyses document
that earnings volatility also affects unconditional conservatism, but this effect is
smaller than the effect from unconditional conservatism to earnings volatility.
Finally, the additional analyses show that unconditional conservatism increases
earnings management, and that earnings management increases the accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts.
My ﬁndings have implications for regulators. Accounting conservatism has the
beneﬁts of protecting investors and creditors from losses. This study shows that
accounting conservatism comes with a cost in the form of less predictable earn-
ings (and as a result, lower forecast accuracy). In view of this, the present study
suggests that regulators should consider the cost of accounting conservatism as
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well when setting accounting standards. This study is, however, limited in a way,
since it only focuses on conservatism from the cost side. Unconditional conser-
vatism also derives from the revenue side, for example, the choice of revenue
recognition method. Firms within, e.g., the construction industry, mainly use the
completed-contract method or the percentage-of-completion method. Assuming
that the contracts are proﬁtable, the completed-contract method is more uncondi-
tionally conservative than the percentage-of-completion method. The reason for
this is that the proﬁt is recognized later using the completed-contract method than
it is when using the percentage-of-completion method. Future research should
therefore also focus on unconditional conservatism from the revenue side.
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A Relation between earnings predictability and earn-
ings volatility in Mensah et al. (2004)
In Mensah et al. (2004), earnings predictability is measured as the sum of the
absolute forecast errors (seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings per share) over
the past four quarters, deﬂated by the previous ﬁscal year-end stock price. The
sum of the absolute forecast errors (SAFE) is very closely related to the standard
deviation of the forecast errors (Std). The standard deviation of the forecast errors
equals
Std[] =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
τ=1
2τ
where τ denotes the forecast error at time τ . Likewise the sum of the absolute
forecast errors equals
SAFE[] =
T∑
τ=1
√
2τ
Furthermore the standard deviation of the forecast error is very closely related to
the standard deviation of the actual value, since
Std[] =
√
V ar[] =
√
V ar[A] + V ar[F ]− 2Cov[A,F ]
where F denotes the forecast value and A denotes the actual value. Mensah et al.
(2004) notes that they use a Random Walk earnings expectation model to calculate
the SAFE. This means that the standard deviation of forecast errors is
Std[τ ] =
√
V ar[Aτ ] + V ar[Aτ−1]− 2Cov[Aτ , Aτ−1]
=
√
V ar[Aτ ] + V ar[Aτ−1]− 2Corr[Aτ , Aτ−1]
√
V ar[Aτ ]
√
V ar[Aτ−1]
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Since V ar[Aτ ] and V ar[Aτ−1] are very closely related, the standard deviation of
forecast errors is approximately
Std[τ ] ≈
√
2V ar[Aτ ](1− Corr[Aτ , Aτ−1]) = Std[Aτ ]
√
2(1− Corr[Aτ , Aτ−1])
This means that the sum of the absolute forecast errors is very closely related to
the standard deviation of the actual values. In Mensah et al. (2004) earnings pre-
dictability is measured as the sum of the absolute seasonally adjusted quarterly
earnings per share, deﬂated by the previous ﬁscal year-end stock price; whereas
earnings volatility is measured as the coefﬁcient of variation (standard deviation
divided by the mean) of the last ﬁve years’ earnings before extraordinary items de-
ﬂated by the absolute median. This difference in estimation period (four quarters
rather than ﬁve years) along with the different scaling (previous ﬁscal year-end
stock price rather than the absolute median) will of course weaken the relation
between earnings predictability and earnings volatility. Table 8 in Mensah et al.
(2004) shows the regression results of regressing earnings predictability on con-
servatism, earnings volatility, and other controls. It shows that the only variable
that is signiﬁcant (at the 0.05 level) in all four quarters (one regression for each
quarter) is the coefﬁcient of variation (this is signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level). The
adjusted R-squares are between 68% and 80% in the four quarters. This shows
that even though the estimation period for earnings predictability and earnings
volatility are different, they still seem to largely capture the same underlying con-
struct.
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Earnings Predictability and the Earnings
Response Coefﬁcient
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Abstract
One way to measure the informativeness of accounting information is the rela-
tion between unexpected stock returns and unexpected earnings (the Earnings
Response Coefﬁcient (ERC)). This paper analyzes how earnings predictability
affects the ERC. Earlier literature ﬁnds contradictory results about the relation
between earnings predictability and the ERC, which might be explained by the
earnings expectation model. I use three different measures of earnings predictabil-
ity (earnings persistence, earnings volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion) and
analytically show how they are related to each other and the ERC (without as-
suming a speciﬁc earnings expectation model). The analysis reveals that higher
earnings volatility is associated with a higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion
and lower earnings persistence. I provide evidence that a higher ERC is associ-
ated with a higher earnings predictability.
Keywords: Earnings response coefﬁcient, Earnings predictability.
JEL classiﬁcation: M41, G12, G14, G17.
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1 Introduction
An unresolved issue in the accounting literature is how earnings predictability
affects the returns–earnings relation, also known as the Earnings Response Coef-
ﬁcient (ERC). Earnings predictability refers to the ability of earnings forecasting
models to forecast accurately. Researchers have looked at the relation between
earnings predictability and the ERC in different ways, by assuming speciﬁc earn-
ings expectation models (e.g., Lipe (1990) assumes that earnings expectations
can be generated using an integrated autoregressive process of ﬁnite order as the
earnings model). The reason why there is disagreement in the literature about
whether higher earnings predictability is associated with a higher ERC (i.e. a
positive relation) or associated with a lower ERC (i.e. a negative relation), could
be the research approach or the difference in expectation models. As far as I know,
no previous studies have analyzed analytically the relation between the ERC and
earnings predictability without assuming a speciﬁc earnings expectation model.
In this paper I show that the ERC increases with earnings predictability (mea-
sured as earnings persistence, earnings volatility, or analyst forecast dispersion).
The results do not rely on a speciﬁc earnings expectation model, but only on
function approximations and the theory of probability. Using linear regression
I empirically estimate the relation between the ERC and earnings predictability.
Whether the relation between the ERC and earnings predictability is positive or
negative is not obvious. Higher earnings predictability is likely to be reﬂected in
a lower required return. Thus, (assuming that prices follow fundamental values)
stock prices will react more strongly to an earnings surprise when predictability
is higher. Likewise, one way of measuring earnings predictability is by earnings
persistence, where a higher earnings predictability is associated with a higher
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earnings persistence. Thus, an earnings surprise will be followed by a stronger
price reaction when earnings have a higher predictability (Ohlson (1995)). This
suggests that a higher earnings predictability is associated with a higher ERC. On
the other hand, a higher earnings predictability indicates less uncertainty about
future earnings. E.g., one measure of earnings predictability used in this paper is
analyst earnings forecast dispersion, where a lower forecast dispersion indicates
a higher earnings predictability. Lower forecast dispersion means that analysts
agree more about future earnings than when the forecast dispersion is higher.
When the agreement about future earnings is higher, it is likely that price reac-
tions when earnings information is announced are smaller than the price reactions
in the case of less agreement about future earnings. Thus it is not clear whether
higher earnings predictability is related with a higher or a lower ERC.
If markets are perfect and complete, then the change in stock price would be equal
to economic earnings. This means that if accounting earnings perfectly measured
economic earnings, the ERC would be equal to one. If one takes the view that
higher quality accounting earnings provide more information about the economic
earnings, then it is important to study how different earnings quality measures
are related to the ERC. Whether higher earnings predictability is associated with
higher earnings quality is not obvious. Higher earnings predictability leads to
less noise in the earnings signal, and could therefore be interpreted as being more
trustworthy. However, if there is earnings smoothing going on, earnings become
more predictable but not more trustworthy. If one uses the ERC as a measure of
earnings quality, (see Dechow et al. (2010) for a review of the literature on earn-
ings quality), greater earnings predictability is associated with higher earnings
quality if it is positively related to the ERC.
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In order to get insight into the relation between the ERC and earnings predictabil-
ity, I use the following deﬁnition of the ERC: it is deﬁned as the covariance be-
tween unexpected returns and unexpected earnings divided by the variance of the
unexpected earnings. By calculating the derivative of the ERC with respect to the
earnings predictability, I analyze the relation between the ERC and earnings pre-
dictability. I measure earnings predictability in three different ways: as earnings
persistence, earnings volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion. A greater earn-
ings persistence indicates higher earnings predictability, whereas a higher earn-
ings volatility together with a higher analyst forecast dispersion indicate a lower
earnings predictability. The analytical analysis leads to the hypothesis that the
ERC increases with any of the three measures of earnings predictability. The hy-
potheses are empirically tested using the two-stage approach from Cready et al.
(2001). First, the individual ﬁrm’s ERC is estimated. Then the estimated ERC
from the earlier regression is regressed on the earnings predictability variables.
I use the difference between realized earnings and analyst earnings forecasts as
a measure of unexpected earnings because I expect analyst forecasts to be more
closely related to market expectations than are time-series forecasts, since ana-
lysts are intermediaries for investors.
The ﬁndings show that the ERC is positively related to earnings persistence (i.e.,
the autocorrelation in the ROE), which is in line with earlier research (Kormendi
and Lipe (1987), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Collins and Kothari (1989), Lipe
(1990) and Ohlson (1995)). The ﬁndings further show that the ERC decreases
with unexpected earnings volatility (consistent with Teets and Wasley (1996))
and analyst forecast dispersion. Thus all three measures of earnings predictability
show that the ERC is positively related to earnings predictability. These ﬁndings
suggest that accounting earnings information is of higher quality for ﬁrms with
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higher earnings predictability.
2 Related research
The cornerstones in accounting related capital market research are Ball and Brown
(1968) and Beaver (1968). These event studies analyzed the stock price reactions
to earnings announcements. The Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) literature
originated from these studies and the ﬁeld is very well studied, with branches in
other accounting literature as well. For example, current research uses the ERC
as a measure of earnings quality because it relates earnings information to stock
investment decisions, reﬂected in stock returns.
Beaver et al. (1980) suggested that not only do earnings convey information about
prices, but prices also convey information about earnings, because in their view
earnings and prices are jointly determined by an underlying state generating pro-
cess. This idea led to another very closely related branch of the literature: the
earnings recognition timeliness (ERT) literature. Whereas the ERC literature
studied the return–earnings relation, the ERT literature focuses on the “reverse”
relation: the earnings–return relation. Basu (1997) suggest that earnings are more
sensitive to bad news (measured by the stock return), because the magnitude of
the bad news is incorporated immediately in earnings, as opposed to good news,
which is recognized over a longer period. Basu (1997) interpret this ﬁnding as a
sign of conditional accounting conservatism1.
The present paper focuses on the relation between earnings predictability and
1Accounting conservatism is referred to as conditional conservatism if it is dependent on the news (Beaver and
Ryan (2005))
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the ERC. The earlier literature that has studied this relation has speciﬁed one or
another speciﬁc earnings expectation model. The disagreement in the earlier lit-
erature about how the ERC is related to earnings predictability could, therefore,
have arisen from the differences in earnings expectation models and the deﬁni-
tions of earnings predictability. Lipe (1990) assumes that earnings follow an inte-
grated autoregressive process of ﬁnite order, and uses the variance of the residual
from this model as a measure of earnings predictability: a lower residual variance
means a higher earnings predictability. Theoretical and empirical studies ﬁnd a
positive relation between earnings predictability and the ERC. This is in line with
the empirical ﬁndings in Teets and Wasley (1996) and Ecker et al. (2006). Using
the difference between realized earnings and analyst earnings forecasts, Teets and
Wasley (1996) show that the ERC and the variance of unexpected earnings are
negatively related. By dividing the sample period from 1971–1990 into four sub-
periods with 20 quarters (ﬁve years) in each subperiod, Teets and Wasley (1996)
obtain a sample of 6,300 ﬁrm–period observations. These ﬁrm–period observa-
tions are then randomly assigned to 84 equal-sized different portfolios (with 75
ﬁrm–period observations in each portfolio). Teets and Wasley (1996) estimate the
ERC and the variance of unexpected earnings for each ﬁrm within the portfolio in
order to estimate the correlation between the ERC and the variance of unexpected
earnings for the portfolio. Teets and Wasley (1996) show that for all 84 portfo-
lios the correlation is negative. Ecker et al. (2006) focus on earnings quality and
ﬁnds that their proposed earnings quality measure (“e-loading”) is related with the
ERC. They ﬁnd that a higher e-loading (lower earnings quality) is associated with
a lower ERC. Furthermore, they show that other widely used measures of earn-
ings quality (among them, earnings predictability) are aligned with the e-loading
measure of earnings quality. Thus the ﬁndings in Ecker et al. (2006) suggest that
a higher earnings predictability should be associated with a higher ERC.
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If one takes a different view of earnings predictability and measures it as earn-
ings persistence (earnings autocorrelation), where a higher earnings autocorrela-
tion means a higher earnings predictability, a positive relation between earnings
predictability and the ERC is also shown in Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins
and Kothari (1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Lipe (1990), Ohlson (1995)
and Ecker et al. (2006)2.
On the other hand, Sadka and Sadka (2009) use a coefﬁcient estimate and the
R-square from a regression of lagged returns on earnings changes as measures of
earnings predictability. These measures rely on the assumption that returns are a
predictor of expected future earnings changes. By using an inverse regression and
by using the realized value instead of the expected earnings changes, this creates
a measurement error in the expected earnings changes. This measurement error
biases the coefﬁcient downwards and increases the residual error. When earn-
ings predictability increases, the expected value is closer to the realized value3
which means that the measurement error is smaller. This means that the coef-
ﬁcient estimate from the regression and the R-square are increasing in earnings
predictability. Sadka and Sadka (2009) then uses earnings changes as a measure
of unexpected earnings and show that there is a negative relation between earnings
predictability and the ERC, by dividing their dataset into portfolios and showing
that more aggregated data (dividing the dataset into a lesser number of portfolios)
increases earnings predictability and at the same time decreases the ERC.
2As mentioned above, Ecker et al. (2006) show that higher earnings quality is associated with a higher ERC and
that the different earnings quality measures used in the literature (e.g., e-loading, earnings predictability, and earnings
persistence) are aligned. Thus a higher earnings persistence is associated with a higher ERC.
3Put another way: When earnings predictability increases, the forecast error becomes smaller.
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Earnings predictability (i.e., the inverse of the variance of the unexpected earn-
ings) can also be viewed as an accounting based measure of risk. Beaver et al.
(1970) analyze how accounting based risk measures relate to the market based
risk measure, β. They ﬁnd that earnings variability (the time-series standard de-
viation of earnings) and the accounting β4 are positively related to the market
β5. In line with this ﬁnding, Beaver et al. (1979) ﬁnd a positive relation be-
tween the absolute value of unexpected earnings (forecast error) and the market
β6. Thus cross-sectional differences in earnings variability might also capture
cross-sectional differences in market β.
Other studies (Collins and Kothari (1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Cham-
bers et al. (2005)) analyze how market β affects the ERC. Collins and Kothari
(1989) ﬁnds a negative relation between market β and the ERC. However, Cready
et al. (2001) points to the fact that the sign of the parameter estimates from a
reverse regression with multiple dual interactions (the estimation procedure used
in Collins and Kothari (1989)) can not be directly interpreted (i.e., a negative pa-
rameter estimate for a reverse regression being interpreted as a positive relation
in the direct regression and vice versa). Cready et al. (2001) furthermore follow a
two-stage estimation approach on the sample from Collins and Kothari (1989) and
4The accounting β is deﬁned analogously to the market β. Thus, the accounting β is the parameter estimate of β
in the following regression:
Ei = α+ βEM + ωi
5Among the seven accounting risk measures (payout ratio, asset growth, leverage, ﬁrm size, liquidity, and ac-
counting beta) used in Beaver et al. (1970), earnings variability is the accounting based risk measure that has the
highest (absolute) correlation with market β.
6Furthermore Beaver et al. (1979) studies the relation between unexpected earnings and unexpected returns (the
residuals from the market model). Beaver et al. (1979) refer to the unexpected returns as unsystematic returns. They
ﬁnd this relation to be positive (i.e., a positive ERC).
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show that the relation between market β and the ERC actually is positive. Easton
and Zmijewski (1989) and Chambers et al. (2005)7 ﬁnd no signiﬁcant (0.05 level)
relation between market β and ERC. Thus, the risk view of earnings predictabil-
ity provides little evidence of a relation between earnings predictability and the
ERC. Basu (2005) suggest that the different ﬁndings in the literature regarding the
association between risk and ERC could be explained by the differences in return
measurement intervals, the differences in returns speciﬁcations, the differences in
the unexpected earnings measures, and/or the differences in test periods.
3 The relation between the ERC and earnings pre-
dictability
As mentioned in Section 1, the Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) is deﬁned
as the covariance between the unexpected returns and the unexpected earnings
divided by the variance of the unexpected returns, which is equal to θ in the fol-
lowing regression:
URt = α + θUXt + t
where URt is the unexpected return at time t, UXt is the unexpected earnings at
time t, and t is an error term.
The ERC is a measure of the relation between (unexpected) earnings and (un-
expected) price changes. Since Rt is the price change scaled by the beginning
price, it is natural to scale Xt by the beginning price as well. However, in the
literature, different scaling variables are used. Nonetheless, I show (in Appendix
7However, Chambers et al. (2005) ﬁnd a positive relation between the total risk (stock price variance) and the
ERC.
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A) that scaling only affects the ERC in a proportional way, where the proportion-
ality constants are deterministic. Thus the relation between the ERC and earnings
predictability is not affected by the scaling variable.
To analytically analyze how the ERC is related to earnings predictability, I calcu-
late the derivative of the ERC with respect to the earnings predictability (denoted
by Ψ). Ψ could in principle be any variable, but in relation to the interests of this
paper, Ψ would be the earnings predictability. Taking the derivative of the ERC
with respect to Ψ gives
∂ERCt
∂Ψ
=
∂Cov[URt,UXt]V ar[UXt]
∂Ψ
=
∂Cov[URt,UXt]
∂Ψ V ar[UXt]− Cov[URt, UXt]∂V ar[UXt]∂Ψ
V ar[UXt]2
=
1
V ar[UXt]
(
∂Cov[URt, UXt]
∂Ψ
− ERCt∂V ar[UXt]
∂Ψ
)
(1)
So in order to determine whether the ERC is positively or negatively related
to earnings predictability, we need to determine the sign of ∂Covt−1[URt,UXt]∂Ψ and
∂V art−1[UXt]
∂Ψ . To analyze whether
∂Covt−1[URt,UXt]
∂Ψ is positive or negative I assume
that log returns are conditionally normally distributed. Thus we have that the
unexpected returns equals
URt = Rt = Et−1[Rt] = eln(1+Rt) − eEt−1[ln(1+Rt)]+ 12V art−1[ln(1+Rt)]
This implies that the covariance between the unexpected returns and the unex-
pected earnings is
Cov[URt, UXt] = Cov
[
eln(1+Rt), UXt
]
−Cov
[
eEt−1[ln(1+Rt)]+
1
2V art−1[ln(1+Rt)], UXt
]
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Furthermore, I assume that UXt andEt−1[ln(1+Rt)] are normally distributed and
that V art−1[ln(1 + Rt)] is truncated normally distributed. Thus we have (using
Stein’s Lemma) that
Cov[URt, UXt] = E
[
eln(1+Rt)
]
Cov [ln(1 +Rt), UXt]
−E
[
eEt−1[ln(1+Rt)]+
1
2V art−1[ln(1+Rt)]
]
·Cov
[
Et−1 [ln(1 +Rt)] +
1
2
V art−1 [ln(1 +Rt)] , UXt
]
= E [1 +Rt]Cov [ln(1 +Rt), UXt]− E [Et−1 [1 +Rt]]
·Cov
[
Et−1 [ln(1 +Rt)] +
1
2
V art−1 [ln(1 +Rt)] , UXt
]
= E [1 +Rt]Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
+E [1 +Rt]
1
2
Cov [V art−1 [ln(1 +Rt)] ,ΔEt[Xt]]
The variance of the log returns and the unexpected earnings are assumed to be
independent. Thus the covariance between the unexpected returns and the unex-
pected earnings is
Cov[URt, UXt] = E [1 +Rt]Cov [ΔEt [ln(1 +Rt)] ,ΔEt [Xt]]
The derivative of Cov[URt, UXt] with respect to Ψ is
∂Cov[URt, UXt]
∂Ψ
=
∂E [1 +Rt]
∂Ψ
Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
+E [1 +Rt]
Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
∂Ψ
(2)
Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 1 gives
∂ERCt
∂Ψ
=
1
V ar[UXt]
∂E [1 +Rt]
∂Ψ
Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
+
1
V ar[UXt]
E [1 +Rt]
Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
∂Ψ
− 1
V ar[UXt]
ERCt
∂V ar[UXt]
∂Ψ
(3)
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In order to further analyze the relation between the ERC and earnings predictabil-
ity, I need to deﬁne a measure for the construct (i.e., make the construct mea-
surable). I measure earnings predictability three different ways: as earnings per-
sistence, earnings volatility (variance), and analyst forecast dispersion. I choose
the two ﬁrst measures in order to be in line with the main deﬁnitions of earnings
predictability used in earlier research. Even though earlier studies do not refer to
earnings persistence as a measure of earnings predictability (Kormendi and Lipe
(1987) and Collins and Kothari (1989)), it can be viewed as such, since higher
earnings persistence implies that current earnings are more informative about fu-
ture earnings and thereby future earnings are easier to predict.
Lipe (1990) and Dichev and Tang (2009) refer to earnings predictability as the
variance of the residuals from an expectations model. Using this deﬁnition, earn-
ings variance and earnings predictability are very closely related8. Since there are
an unlimited number of time-series based models, I instead use earnings volatility
since it does not require a speciﬁc expectations model in order to be estimated.
The third earnings predictability measure (analyst forecast dispersion) is in line
with the deﬁnition of earnings predictability as being the variance of the residu-
als from an expectations model (Lipe (1990) and Dichev and Tang (2009)). In
this relation, analyst forecasts are the expectations. Since the realized value is the
same for all analysts (for a given ﬁrm at a given point in time), the variance of the
residuals from the analysts’ forecasts is the same as the variance of the analysts’
forecasts. Thus analyst forecast dispersion can be viewed as a market-based ver-
sion of the deﬁnitions of earnings predictability in Lipe (1990) and Dichev and
Tang (2009).
8Using an AR1 expectation model. Untabulated results show that the correlation is above 0.9
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Starting with earnings persistence, I argue (in Appendix B) that the term ∂E[(1+Rt)]∂Ψ
in Equation 3 is positive. Based on Vuolteenaho (2002), I further argue (in Ap-
pendix C) that the term Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]] and the term
Cov[ΔEt[ln(1+Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]
∂Ψ in Equation 3 are also positive. Furthermore, since ln(1 +
Rt) is assumed to be normally distributed, then 1 + Rt > 0. Thus the term
E[1 + Rt] in Equation 3 is positive. Additionally, in Appendix D, I show (under
reasonable assumptions) that ∂V art−1[Xt]∂Ψ < 0. Furthermore, in Appendix E, I show
that ∂V art−1[UXt]∂V art−1[Xt] > 0. Thus, from the chain rule, it follows that
∂V art−1[UXt]
∂Ψ =
∂V art−1[Xt]
∂Ψ
∂V art−1[UXt]
∂V art−1[Xt]
< 0. So the term ∂V art−1[UXt]∂Ψ in Equation 3 is negative.
This is also in line with ﬁndings in the earlier literature (Dichev and Tang (2008),
Dichev and Tang (2009) and Li (2011)). Thus (assuming that the ERC is positive
and the other assumptions hold), based on Equation 3, I conclude that earnings
persistence is positively related to the ERC. Therefore, my ﬁrst hypothesis is that
H1: Earnings persistence is positively related to the ERC
This hypothesis is in line with Collins and Kothari (1989). Using the assumptions
that the dividend discount model correctly predicts stock prices and that future
expected dividends are linearly related to current earnings, Collins and Kothari
(1989) argues that the ERC is positively related to earnings persistence. The ar-
gument is that a higher earnings persistence increases the linear relation between
current earnings and future expected dividends, which implies that the strength of
the relation between current earnings and price increases. Thereby, an earnings
shock will create a larger return shock (i.e., the ERC will be higher) when earn-
ings persistence is higher.
Using the chain rule, the relation between any other variable and the ERC can
be studied by studying the relation between that variable (Φ) and the earnings
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persistence (ρ). The chain rule yields
∂ERCt
∂Φ
=
∂ERCt
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂Φ
Thus, since earnings persistence and volatility are negatively related (as shown in
Appendix D) and I expect earnings persistence to be positively related to the ERC
(see H1 above), this leads to my next hypothesis:
H2: Earnings volatility is negatively related to the ERC
In Appendix E, I show that the time-series variance (i.e. volatility) of unexpected
earnings and realized earnings are positively related. Furthermore, in Appendix
F, I show that the time-series variance of unexpected earnings and analyst forecast
dispersion is positively related. Thus (by using the chain rule) I further hypothe-
size that
H3: Earnings forecast dispersion is negatively related to the ERC
4 Empirical analysis and measures
I estimate the empirical relation between the Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC)
and earnings predictability (whether measured by earnings persistence, earnings
volatility, or earnings forecast dispersion) using a two-stage approach as in Cready
et al. (2001): ﬁrst, the individual ﬁrm’s ERC is estimated; second, the ERC is re-
gressed on the variables of interest. If analyzing cross-sectional ERC differences
is of interest, then the ERC should be estimated using time-series data, which gen-
erates individual ﬁrm-speciﬁc ERC estimates. But, if time-series ERC differences
are of interest, then the ERC should be estimated using cross-sectional data for
each year, which will generate one time-series of ERC estimates. Since this paper
analyzes the relation between the ERC and earnings predictability, I estimated the
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individual ﬁrm’s ERC using time-series data. Likewise, the measures of earnings
predictability are estimated using time-series data. The three different measures
of earnings predictability are measured as follows. The volatility of unexpected
earnings (EARN V OL) is estimated as the time-series variance of unexpected
earnings over the same estimation period as the ERC. Persistence in unexpected
earnings (PERSIST ) is estimated as the autocorrelation of unexpected earnings
over the same period as the ERC. As proved in Section F, the time-series variance
of unexpected earnings is a function of the mean over time of the earnings forecast
dispersion across analysts. Thus the earnings forecast dispersion is estimated as
the time-series mean of the analyst earnings forecast dispersion over the estima-
tion period of the ERC. To reduce the skewness of the two variables (volatility in
unexpected earnings and earnings forecast dispersion), I transform these variables
by the natural logarithm.
Estimate of the unexpected returns and unexpected earnings are needed in order
to estimate the ERC. The unexpected returns are estimated as the difference be-
tween the stock returns and the expected returns (estimated by the market model).
Unexpected earnings are estimated as the difference between announced actual
earnings minus the latest announced earnings forecast (scaled by price). Thus the
unexpected returns window should begin when the latest earnings forecast are an-
nounced and end when earnings are announced, so that the unexpected earnings
and the unexpected returns correspond to each other. This is because if the market
receives new earnings information (at some point in time in the period between
the latest announced earnings forecast and the earnings announcement) this will
lead to a revised earnings expectation by the market, which will result in an im-
mediately change in the stock’s price (assuming that the market is efﬁcient). Thus
the movement of the stock price that occurs when earnings are announced is now
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instead based on the revised earnings expectation, which is unobservable. This is
illustrated in Table 1.
However, in order to be certain that the new earnings information (that emerges
because of the earnings announcement) is incorporated in the stock price, I expand
the return window so that it ends two days after the earnings announcement. The
magnitude of the unexpected return is proportional to the return window length.
Thus I need to normalize the unexpected return, since the length of the return pe-
riod differs between ﬁrms (and over time). I normalize the unexpected returns to
the daily returns by calculating the daily geometric mean return. The unexpected
returns are estimated as the residual from the regression of ﬁrm returns on value-
weighted market returns.
The estimation approach from Cready et al. (2001) starts with estimating the fol-
lowing regression
URi,t = αi + θiUXi,t + i,t. (4)
Then, the estimate of θi, which is denoted by θ̂i, is used as the dependent variable
in the second-stage regression
θ̂i = α + β1EARN PREDi + β2MTBi + ξi (5)
where UR, UX , EARN PRED and MTB are, respectively, the return, unex-
pected earnings, earnings predictability, and the market-to-book ratio. The indices
i and t denote ﬁrm i and time t.
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However, since the ERC (θi) and earnings predictability (EARN PREDi) are
both estimated variables, they are measured with error. Because the parameter es-
timates (and the standard errors of the parameter estimates) are biased and can not
be corrected for analytically, statistical inference should not be based on the direct
regression presented above (Equation 5). Even though analytical bias correction
formulas exist (as shown in Appendix G) the analytical bias correction can not be
done in practice because the variance of the measurement error is unknown and
can not be estimated.
Cready et al. (2001) propose an approach for creating bounds for the parame-
ter estimates using a reverse regression technique. According to their approach, if
all the variables are measured with error, the second-stage regression should not
be a single regression, but the following regression system:
ERC = α0 + α1EARN PRED + α2MTB (6)
EARN PRED = β0 + β1ERC + β2MTB (7)
MTB = λ0 + λ1EARN PRED + λ2ERC (8)
Rearranging the two reverse regressions gives
ERC = −β0
β1
+
1
β1
EARN PRED − β2
β1
MTB (9)
ERC = −λ0
λ2
− λ1
λ2
EARN PRED +
1
λ2
MTB (10)
Thus the two reverse regressions (i.e. (7) and (8)) give implicit coefﬁcient esti-
mates (shown in Equations (9) and (10)) for the direct regression (6). “In order to
unconditionally bound the direct model’s coefﬁcient estimates (i.e., place ranges
on their magnitude) all the normalized coefﬁcient estimates (except the intercept)
derived from each reverse regression must possess the same sign as the coefﬁ-
cient estimates from the direct model. The extreme high and low estimates for
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each coefﬁcient then serve as its maximum likelihood bounds. If, however, any
normalized coefﬁcient estimate differs in sign from its direct model estimate then
not only is that coefﬁcient estimate unbounded, but the coefﬁcient estimates for
all the variables are also unbounded.” (Cready et al. (2001, p. 230)). Thus if
sign(α1) = sign
(
1
β1
)
= sign
(
λ1
λ2
)
and
sign(α2) = sign
(
β2
β1
)
= sign
(
1
λ2
)
the coefﬁcient estimates for EARN PRED and MTB are bounded between
[
min
(
α1,
1
β1
,
λ1
λ2
)
; max
(
α1,
1
β1
,
λ1
λ2
)]
and
[
min
(
α2,
β2
β1
,
1
λ2
)
; max
(
α2,
β2
β1
,
1
λ2
)]
,
respectively. These bounds consistently bound the true regression coefﬁcients
(Klepper and Leamer (1984, p. 164)).
Since the market-to-book ratio in this relation simply captures the scaling factor
difference between the book-value of equity deﬂated ERC and the price-deﬂated
ERC (and not as a measure of growth opportunities as in Cready et al. (2001)), the
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market-to-book ratio is, in relation to the analysis in this paper, measured without
error. Thus, according to Cready et al. (2001) (and Klepper and Leamer (1984)),
the regression where the market-to-book ratio is the independent variable can be
removed from the regression system and sign differences in the market-to-book
ratio do not create unboundedness (Cready et al. (2001, p. 230)). Thus, in this
paper, the regression system becomes
ERC = α0 + α1EARN PRED + α2MTB (11)
EARN PRED = β0 + β1ERC + β2MTB (12)
Since the measure of unexpected earnings might be measured with error, the es-
timates of the ERCs (i.e. θi from Equation 4) might be biased toward zero. To
strengthen the results, the analysis is therefore also carried out where the ERCs
are estimated using the reverse regression, which gives implied ERC estimates
that are upward biased.
EARN PRED and MTB are highly correlated when EARN PRED is mea-
sured as earnings volatility (or forecast dispersion). To deal with this multi-
collinearity issue, I use Principal Component Regression (PCR). Basically, PCR
uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the set of variables by gen-
erating principal components. These principal components are linear transforma-
tions of the observed variables. The principal components that account for the
highest amount of variance in the observed variables are then used as independent
variables in the regression instead of the observed variables. Since the principal
components are linear transformations of the observed variables, the parameter
estimates for the principal components can be easily transformed into parameter
estimates for the observed variables.
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4.1 Data-related issues
The estimation procedure raises some issues related to the data. First, the two
stage approach proposed by Cready et al. (2001) poses the problem of how to di-
vide the data between the two estimation stages. Second, because of the deﬁnition
of the ERC, there are some potential sample selection biases.
4.1.1 Division of data between the two estimation stages
ERCs could be estimates for the individual ﬁrm or for a group of ﬁrms (e.g. an
industry level). Estimating individual ERCs for each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage gives
a larger sample for the second stage regression(s) than when ERCs are estimated
at the group level. However, the estimates of individual ﬁrms’ ERCs might be
unstable because of the short length of the time-series. On the other hand, when
estimating ERCs at the group level, the ﬁrms within a group should be homoge-
neous. Reducing the heterogeneity across observations in a group also reduces
the sample size for the second stage regression(s).
4.1.2 Potential sample selection biases
Since the deﬁnition of the ERC requires that ﬁrms are listed, the sample consist of
larger, more mature ﬁrms. Thus the sample suffers from a “large-ﬁrm” selection
bias. For smaller (and newer) ﬁrms with high uncertainty, earnings predictability
is probably lower than for larger ﬁrms. For these smaller ﬁrms, earnings informa-
tion might be very informative to investors and hence the ERC might be higher.
Thus for smaller ﬁrms, one can expect the opposite relation. However it is im-
possible to estimate the ERC when ﬁrms are not listed. Yet the sample of noted
ﬁrms can be divided into smaller and larger ﬁrms. So (even though this does not
deal with the issue of ﬁrms’ not being listed), one way to deal with the “large-ﬁrm
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bias” is to use propensity score matching (PSM). In short, PSM splits the sample
into two samples (i.e. large ﬁrms and small ﬁrms), where each observation from
one of the groups is matched with one observation from the other group. Each
pair of observations is matched based on propensity scores, which is simply the
probability of the observation’s belonging to the ﬁrst group (i.e. the sample of
large ﬁrms). The predictor variables used to estimate the probability of being in
the ﬁrst group should also be associated with the dependent variable of interest
(i.e. the ERC).
Thus (in this case), the sample should be split into two: one of large ﬁrms and
the other of small ﬁrms. Sorting on ﬁrm size and using the median ﬁrm as a
threshold could be used to divide the sample into two samples. Then a probit or
a logistic regression with the dependent variable being one if the ﬁrm belongs to
the large ﬁrm sample and zero otherwise should be estimated. The predictor vari-
able(s) used should be earnings predictability, but could also include, e.g. bid–ask
spreads or stock price volatility, since both these variables are expected to be as-
sociated with ﬁrm size and the ERC.
The sample suffers not only from a “large-ﬁrm” selection bias, but also from
another selection bias: survivorship bias. This is because the ﬁrm ERCs are esti-
mated from individual ﬁrm time-series. Thus, ﬁrms need to survive over a time
period in order to estimate individual ﬁrm ERCs. Firms that go bankrupt and ﬁrms
that are acquired and then delisted during the estimation period are therefore ex-
cluded from the sample. To deal with survivorship bias, the Heckman correction
approach can be used. The Heckman correction approach is described in Baltagi
(2001, pp. 383–409). The following model was presented in Baltagi (2001, p.
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385)
y∗ = xβ + u and I∗ = zγ − 
where u and  are regression errors and I∗ is an indicator variable that equals one
if y∗ is observed and zero otherwise. Thus, in relation to the case in this paper,
y∗ would be the ERC, x would be a vector with earnings predictability and the
market-to-book ratio as elements, I∗ would be an indicator variable that equals
one if the ﬁrm has the required minimum time-series observations for unexpected
returns and unexpected earnings, and z would be a vector whose elements are pre-
dictors for the ﬁrm’s being acquired or going bankrupt over the estimation period.
Baltagi (2001, p. 386) explain a two-stage method to deal practically with this:
“In the ﬁrst stage, γ is estimated by the probit maximum likelihood method. The
least squares method can then be applied to estimate β and σ1 in
y = xβ + σ1
(
−φ (zγ̂)
Φ (zγ̂)
)
+ η˜
with the observed subsample corresponding to I = 1, where γ̂ is the probit maxi-
mum likelihood estimate of γ.”
4.2 Sample selection
My sample includes ﬁrms from Compustat and ﬁrms where a one-year ahead
earnings forecast is available from I/B/E/S. I use the sample period 1995–2012,
since Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007) show that a signiﬁcant shift in mean earnings
took place in the early 1990s. To control for outliers, I exclude ﬁrms where the
absolute ROE or absolute returns are larger than 1, and Winsorize all variables at
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Firms with SIC codes in the intervals [4900–4999]
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or [6000–6999] are utilities and ﬁnancial institutions. Since these types of ﬁrms
are regulated, they are excluded from the sample as well.
4.3 Descriptive statistics and results
Unexpected returns and unexpected earnings are used to estimate the individual
ﬁrms’ ERCs. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show the distribution of unex-
pected returns and unexpected earnings. The mean (median) of the price-deﬂated
unexpected earnings is -0.9% (0.0%), which indicates that analysts’ forecasts are
close to being unbiased. The mean (median) unexpected stock return is 0.0%
(0.0%). That the mean unexpected stock return is 0.0% is not surprising since the
unexpected stock returns are the residual from the market model regression. In an
OLS regression, the mean of the residual is always zero.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for returns and unexpected earnings
Variable N Mean Std Dev 0% Min 10% 25% Q1 50% Median 75% Q3 90% 100% Max
UNEXP EARN 49,836 -0.009 0.072 -1.203 -0.014 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.295
UNEXP RET 49,836 -0.000 0.007 -0.054 -0.008 -0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.007 0.072
Distribution of the data used to estimate the ﬁrm speciﬁc Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC).
UNEXP RET is the unexpected return of the stock (measured as the difference between realized
return and the expected return, where expected return is estimated using the market model). UN-
EXP EARN is the ﬁrm’s unexpected earnings (measured as the difference between realized earnings
and the mean value of analyst earning forecasts deﬂated by stock price at the beginning of the year).
Table 3 shows that the mean (median) ERC estimated from a direct regression is
0.251 (0.027), whereas the mean (median) ERC estimated from a reverse regres-
sion is 4.024 (0.484). This indicates that the distribution of the ERC estimates are
right skewed.
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Table 4 presents the correlations between the ERC, earnings persistence, earnings
volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and the market-to-book ratio. It shows
that earnings persistence and the ERC are positively correlated. Furthermore, it
shows that earnings volatility (forecast dispersion) and the ERC are negatively
correlated. These correlations are in line with the theoretical predictions from
Section 3. Lastly, Table 4 shows that earnings volatility and forecast dispersion
are positively correlated. This is in line with the theoretical ﬁndings in Appendix
F.
Table 4: Correlation matrix
ERC D ERC R LN VOL EARN LN FORECAST DISP PERSIST EARN MTB
ERC D 0.8208*** -0.1801*** -0.1770*** 0.0825*** 0.1100***
ERC R 0.2924*** -0.1703*** -0.1736*** 0.0928*** 0.1229***
LN VOL EARN -0.1717*** -0.0543*** 0.6344*** -0.0646*** -0.1420***
LN FORECAST DISP -0.1896*** -0.0495** 0.6718*** -0.2964*** -0.2926***
PERSIST EARN 0.0632*** 0.0385** -0.0282* -0.2521*** 0.1521***
MTB 0.1100*** 0.0402*** -0.0987*** -0.2455*** 0.1283***
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Correlation coefﬁcients
below (above) the diagonal are the Pearson (Spearman) correlation. ERC D and ERC R are the
ERC estimated using direct regression and reverse regression, respectively. PERSIST EARN is
the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of unexpected earnings (scaled by price). LN VOL EARN is the
logarithm of unexpected earnings volatility (which is the standard deviation of unexpected earn-
ings) LN FORECAST DISP is the logarithm of the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts.
MTB is the market-to-book ratio.
Table 5 presents the results from the regression of ERC on earnings persistence
and the market-to-book ratio. In Table 5.A the ﬁrst row presents the direct re-
gression of ERC on the variables PERSIST EARN and MTB, whereas the sec-
ond row presents the implied coefﬁcient estimates from a reverse regression of
PERSIST EARN on ERC and MTB. The coefﬁcient estimate for MTB changes
from positive to negative in 5.A, which would have implied unboundness for both
the coefﬁcient estimates for PERSIST EARN and MTB. However, since MTB is
measured without error this does not create unboundness (as noted in Section 4).
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So, in line with expectations, a higher market-to-book ratio and persistence of
unexpected earnings is associated with a higher ERC.
As noted in Collins and Kothari (1989), the market-to-book ratio also captures
persistence and growth. Thus the model may suffer from “omitted-variable bias”
because the model does not include a measure for growth. Because the market-
to-book ratio is correlated with the growth (the omitted variable), this creates
the same issue as when the market-to-book ratio has measurement error (i.e. the
market-to-book ratio is correlated with the error term). Hence the change in the
sign of the estimate of the coefﬁcient for the market-to-book ratio in Table 5.A
may generate unboundness for the coefﬁcient estimates for PERSIST EARN on
ERC and MTB. Klepper and Leamer (1984) deals with this issue by imposing a
condition that creates lower and upper bounds for the coefﬁcient estimates.
Klepper and Leamer (1984) show that if one can conclude that the squared mul-
tiple correlation (R2) does not exceed a given level (R∗2) if there were no mea-
surement error in the explanatory variables, then lower and upper bounds for the
coefﬁcient estimates can be calculated. Table 5.B presents statistics about this
condition. The third column presents the direct regression estimates (where there
is measurement error in the independent variables) and shows that the R-Square
for the direct regression is 2.7%9. The table shows that if the measurement er-
ror in the variables were removed and this would not imply that R-Squared in-
creased to more than 7.8%, then both the coefﬁcient estimates would be positively
9At ﬁrst the R-Square of 2.7% for the direct regression might seem low. However earlier studies (Collins and
Kothari (1989) and Basu (1997)) in this ﬁeld also have low R-Squares, but are not directly comparable because they
do not use the two-stage regression method. Collins and Kothari (1989) report R-Squares between 12% and 20%.
However, those are pooled regressions with ﬁxed year effects. Basu (1997) also use pooled regressions and report
R-Squares between 8% and 13%
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bounded (i.e., PERSIST EARN and MTB would lie in the interval [0.087;2.476]
and [0;0.104], respectively).
Besides generating bounds for the coefﬁcient estimates as a function of the squared
multiple correlation, Klepper and Leamer (1984) also show that coefﬁcient bounds
can be created if one can conclude that the correlation between the true construct
and the variable used to measure the construct is larger than a given level (ρ2∗).
Table 5.C presents a coefﬁcient bound based on this condition. The correlation
values are shown for ﬁve different correlations, where the highest possible cor-
relation of course is one and the lowest correlation shown is the value where the
coefﬁcient estimates still are bounded (i.e. if the correlation value is lower than
0.2, then the coefﬁcient estimates are unbounded). In the last column (where the
correlation equals one), the bound becomes a single point and these coefﬁcients
equal the direct regression coefﬁcients. However, the table also shows that the
correlation between the true construct (earnings predictability) and the measur-
able variable (earnings persistence) should be high (at least 0.8) to bound the co-
efﬁcient for earnings persistence to a positive value (i.e., PERSIST EARN would
then lie in the interval [0.051;0.132]). Based on these three tables, the empirical
analysis suggests (in line with expectations) that both the persistence of unex-
pected earnings and the market-to-book ratio are positively related to the ERC.
Tables 5.A, 5.B and 5.C are based on ERCs that are estimated from a direct re-
gression. Similar to these tables are Tables 5.D, 5.E and 5.F. The only difference
is that these last are based on ERCs estimated from a reverse regression.
In Table 6, the earnings predictability measure used is earnings volatility. Since
the earnings persistence and earnings volatility are negatively related, a negative
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relation between the ERC and earnings volatility is expected (as mentioned in
Section 3). The table shows (in line with expectations) that the ERC and earnings
volatility are negatively related.
Likewise, Table 7 shows the results when analyst forecast dispersion is used as
the measure of earnings predictability. A negative relation between analyst fore-
cast dispersion and ERC is observed, which is in line with expectations. Since
higher (lower) earnings persistence (earnings volatility and forecast dispersion)
indicates higher earnings predictability, a positive (negative) relation between the
ERC and earnings persistence (earnings volatility and forecast dispersion) indi-
cates that higher earnings predictability increases the ERC.
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4.4 Additional analyses
4.4.1 Other measures for unexpected returns
As noted in Section 4, unexpected returns were estimated using the market model
with value weighted returns. Estimating unexpected returns using the market
model with with equal weighted returns or by estimating it as the difference be-
tween the realized ﬁrm returns and the realized returns on a beta matched portfolio
yield similar results.
4.4.2 Transformation of earnings volatility and forecast dispersion
As mentioned in Section 4.2, earnings volatility and forecast dispersion are loga-
rithmically transformed so as to reduce the skewness of the variables. Using the
untransformed variables yields similar results.
4.4.3 The deﬁnition of earnings
Realized earnings in the I/B/E/S database is deﬁned differently than in Compustat.
Generally, I/B/E/S earnings exclude nonrecurring items (such as write-downs),
other special items, and non-operating items from GAAP earnings (Abarbanell
and Lehavy (2007)). To test whether the difference in deﬁnition of the earnings
seems to be important, I also use the EBIT earnings deﬁnition.
Untabulated results show that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between earn-
ings and EBIT persistence is 0.3320 (0.3092) and is statistically signiﬁcant at
a 0.01 level. Likewise, the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between earnings
volatility and EBIT volatility is -0.0149 (0.4490). In this case, the Pearson corre-
lation is insigniﬁcant at the 0.1 level, whereas the Spearman correlation is signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that earnings volatility and EBIT volatility
145
are positively related, but not linearly related.
Table 8 presents the results from the regression of ERC on EBIT persistence and
the market-to-book ratio. The table shows ambiguous results. EBIT persistence is
negatively related to the ERC when the ERCs are estimated from a direct regres-
sion. On the other hand, EBIT persistence and ERC are positively related when
the ERCs are estimated from a reverse regression. Thus the relation between
EBIT persistence and the ERC is unclear, since it depends on how the ERCs are
estimated.
Table 9 presents the results from the regression of ERC on EBIT volatility and
the market-to-book ratio. The results show that EBIT volatility and the ERC are
negatively related.
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4.4.4 Unexpected vs. realized earnings variance and persistence
In Appendix E it is shown that the time-series variance of unexpected earnings is
positively related with the time-series variance of realized earnings. Furthermore,
in Appendix D, it is shown that the relation between the time-series variance of a
given variable and its time-series persistence does not depend on how the variable
is deﬁned. Thus, (from the chain rule we have that) the persistence of unexpected
earnings10 also is positively related with the persistence of realized earnings. Unt-
abulated results show that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between earnings
persistence and the persistence of unexpected earnings is 0.1796 (0.1752) and is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Likewise, the Pearson (Spearman) cor-
relation between earnings volatility and the volatility of unexpected earnings is
0.6352 (0.6808) and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
Even though realized earnings persistence (volatility) and the persistence (volatil-
ity) of unexpected earnings seem to be highly positively correlated, it is still pos-
sible that the relation between the persistence (volatility) of unexpected earnings
and the ERC is different from the relation between realized earnings persistence
(volatility) and the ERC. To test whether the relation (positive or negative) be-
tween the persistence (volatility) of unexpected earnings and the ERC is the same
as the relation between realized earnings persistence (volatility) and the ERC, I
ran the second stage of the two-stage regression using the volatility (persistence)
of unexpected earnings instead of realized earnings variance (persistence).
10Earlier research had argued that because analyst forecast errors (i.e. unexpected earnings) are predictable, then
analysts are irrational in theie forecasts, because since the forecast errors are predictable they should control for this
in their forecasts. Markov and Tamayo (2006) propose another interpretation of this. They argue and empirically
show that the autocorrelation in analysts’ forecast errors can be present when analysts do not know the underlying
time-series process or parameters of the earning series. So if there is a persistence in unexpected earnings, this does
not necessarily mean that the analysts are irrational.
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The results from the regression of ERC on the persistence of unexpected earn-
ings and the market-to-book ratio are shown in Table 10. Like Table 8 (where
earnings predictability is deﬁned as EBIT persistence), the results are ambiguous
because they depend on the estimation of the ERC.
Table 11 presents the results from the regression of ERC on the volatility of unex-
pected earnings and the market-to-book ratio. The results are similar to the results
studying the relation between realized earnings volatility and the market-to-book
ratio.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the relation between earnings predictability and the Earn-
ings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC). It shows that the ERC is a function of earnings
predictability and how different measures of earnings predictability—earnings
(and unexpected earnings) persistence, earnings (and unexpected earnings) volatil-
ity, and analyst forecast dispersion—are related. The empirical ﬁndings show that
the ERC is negatively related to earnings (and unexpected earnings) volatility and
analyst forecast dispersion. With regard to the persistence measure of earnings
predictability, the results are ambiguous. The results show that when the ERCs are
estimated using direct regression, unexpected earnings persistence (EBIT persis-
tence) is positively (negatively) related to the ERC, but when ERCs are estimated
using reverse regression the relation is negative (positive). However when focus-
ing on earnings persistence, the results show that earnings persistence is positively
related to the ERC. Overall, these results suggest that more predictable earnings
have higher value-relevance for investors (i.e. a higher earnings predictability is
associated with a higher ERC).
The earnings quality literature suggests different ways to measure earnings qual-
ity (Dechow et al. (2010)): among them are earnings persistence (measured as the
auto-covariance), earnings smoothness (earnings volatility deﬂated by cash ﬂow
volatility), and the ERC. The literature suggests that a higher earnings quality is
associated with higher levels of the earnings persistence and the ERC, but lower
levels of earnings smoothness (i.e. higher levels of earnings volatility). However,
Dechow et al. (2010) notes that accounting quality is context-speciﬁc. The ﬁnd-
ings in this paper support this context-speciﬁc view of accounting quality, since
the ERC and earnings volatility are negatively related.
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A Scaling
In the literature, unexpected earnings is deﬂated by the lagged book value of eq-
uity, the lagged price, or lagged nominal earnings. Let UXt, Xt, BV Et, Pt, and
ROEt denote the scaled unexpected earnings, nominal earnings, the book value
of equity, the stock price, and Return on Equity at time t, respectively.
In case the unexpected earnings are scaled by the lagged book value of equity,
it is equal to the unexpected ROE, since
UXt =
UXt
BV Et−1
=
Xt
BV Et−1
− Et−1 [Xt]
BV Et−1
= ROEt − Et−1
[
Xt
BV Et−1
]
= ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt]
If, instead, the scaling variable for unexpected earnings is the lagged price or
lagged nominal earnings, then the scaled unexpected earnings can be rewritten so
as to again become a function of unexpected ROE. In the case where it is scaled
by the lagged price, it is equal to
UXt =
UXt
Pt−1
=
Xt
Pt−1
− Et−1 [Xt]
Pt−1
=
Xt
BV Et−1
BV Et−1
Pt−1
− Et−1
[
Xt
BV Et−1
]
BV Et−1
Pt−1
=
BV Et−1
Pt−1
(ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt])
In this case, it is equal to the unexpected ROE times the inverse lagged market-
to-book ratio.
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When it is scaled by lagged earnings, it is equal to
UXt =
UXt
Xt−1
=
Xt
Xt−1
− Et−1 [Xt]
Xt−1
=
Xt
BV Et−1
BV Et−1
Xt−1
− Et−1
[
Xt
BV Et−1
]
BV Et−1
Xt−1
=
BV Et−2
Xt−1
(1 + gBV Et−1 ) (ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt])
=
1 + gBV Et−1
ROEt−1
(ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt])
where gBV Et−1 denotes the growth in book value of the equity at time t− 1.
Since we condition on information at time t − 1, unexpected earnings are pro-
portional to the unexpected ROE for the three scaling factors mentioned above:
lagged book value of equity, lagged price, or lagged nominal earnings. This means
that the Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) is only proportionally different for
the three different scaling factors. The proportional differences are equal to
θBV E =
Covt−1[URt, ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt]]
V art−1[ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt]]
=
BV Et−1
Pt−1
BV Et−1
Pt−1
Covt−1[URt, ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt]](
BV Et−1
Pt−1
)2
V art−1[ROEt − Et−1 [ROEt]]
=
BV Et−1
Pt−1
θP = θX
ROEt−1
1 + gBV Et−1
where θBV E is the ERC where unexpected earnings are deﬂated by the book value
of equity, θP is that where they are deﬂated by price, and θX is when they are
deﬂated by earnings.
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B Derivations
∂E [1 +Rt]
∂Ψ
= E
[
∂eln(1+Rt)
∂Ψ
]
= E
[
eln(1+Rt)
ln(1 +Rt)
∂Ψ
]
= E
[
(1 +Rt)
( ∞∑
j=0
ϑj
ln(1 +ROEt+j)
∂Ψ
−
∞∑
j=1
ϑj
ln(1 +Rt+j)
∂Ψ
+
θt−1
∂Ψ
)]
where θt−1 denotes the log of the market-to-book ratio
(
ln
(
Pt−1
Bt−1
))
at time t− 1.
For most ﬁrms, ROEt > 0, thus, when Ψ denotes earnings persistence, I assume
that ln(1+ROEt+j)∂Ψ > 0. Furthermore, since earnings persistence is more closely
related to future earnings than to future returns, I assume that
ln(1+ROEt+j)
∂Ψ >
ln(1+Rt+j)
∂Ψ . Thus
11
∂E [1 +Rt]
∂Ψ
> 0
11 θt−1
∂Ψ is ignored. However, for most ﬁrms, the current market-to-book ratio is positively related to earnings
persistence, thus θt−1∂Ψ > 0
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C Decomposition of the expected returns
Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that
rt − Et−1[rt] = ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=0
ϑj(et+j − ft+j)
]
−ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=1
ϑjrt+j
]
+ κt
where et denotes the logarithm of one plus the Return On Equity, ft denotes the
logarithm of one plus the interest rate, rt is the excess log stock return12 and κt is
an approximation error. This can easily be rewritten as
ΔEt[r˜t] = r˜t − Et−1[r˜t] = rt + ft − Et−1[rt + ft]
= ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=0
ϑjet+j
]
−ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=1
ϑj(rt+j + ft+j)
]
+ κt
= ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=0
ϑjet+j
]
−ΔEt
[ ∞∑
j=1
ϑj ˜rt+j
]
+ κt
where r˜t denotes the logarithm of one plus the stock return.
The covariance between the log of the unexpected stock returns and the unex-
pected earnings (Cov [ΔEt[ln(1 +Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]) must be positive (if Xt de-
notes ROE13), since a positive change in the expectation of the ROE is likely
to change the expectation of the future ROE in a positive direction as well. Like-
wise, the term ∂Cov[ΔEt[ln(1+Rt)],ΔEt[Xt]]∂Ψ must also be positive ifΨ denotes earnings
persistence, because higher earnings persistence will lead to a larger revision of
future ROE for a given earnings shock.
12Vuolteenaho (2002) deﬁnes the excess log stock return as the logarithm of one plus the stock return minus the
logarithm of one plus the interest rate.
13As mentioned in Appendix A the scaling factor for earnings only affects the scaling of the ERC by a deterministic
scaling factor
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D Relation between variance and ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation
Let ΔXt denote the change in Xt from period t− 1 to t (i.e. ΔXt = Xt −Xt−1).
This means that the ﬁrst order auto-covariance and variance can be rewritten as
Cov[Xt, Xt−1] = Cov[Xt, Xt −ΔXt] = V ar[Xt]− Cov[Xt,ΔXt]
and
V ar[Xt−1] = V ar[Xt −ΔXt] = V ar[Xt] + V ar[ΔXt]− 2Cov[Xt,ΔXt]
Assuming variance stationarity (i.e. V ar[Xt] = V ar[Xt−1]) means that
V ar[Xt−1] = V ar[Xt] + V ar[ΔXt]− 2Cov[Xt,ΔXt]

Cov[Xt,ΔXt] =
1
2
V ar[ΔXt]
and that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation equals
ρ =
Cov[Xt, Xt−1]
Std[Xt]Std[Xt−1]
=
Cov[Xt, Xt−1]
V ar[Xt]
= 1− Cov[Xt,ΔXt]
V ar[Xt]
= 1− 1
2
V ar[ΔXt]
V ar[Xt]
The relation between the variance and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation can be an-
alyzed by calculating the derivative of the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation with respect
to the variance. Thus
∂ρ
∂V ar[Xt]
= −1
2
∂V ar[ΔXt]
∂V ar[Xt]
V ar[Xt]− V ar[ΔXt]
V ar[Xt]2
= −1
2
1
V ar[Xt]
∂V ar[ΔXt]
∂V ar[Xt]
+
1
V ar[Xt]
(1− ρ) (13)
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where
∂V ar[ΔXt]
∂V ar[Xt]
=
∂V ar[Xt]− Cov[Xt, Xt−1]
∂V ar[Xt]
= 1− ∂Cov[Xt, Xt−1]
∂V ar[Xt]
= 1− ∂ρV ar[Xt]
∂V ar[Xt]
= 1−
(
∂ρ
∂V ar[Xt]
1
V ar[Xt]
+ ρ
1
V ar[Xt]2
)
(14)
Substituting Equation 14 into Equation 13 and solving for ∂ρ∂V ar[Xt] yields
∂ρ
∂V ar[Xt]
=
ρ+ V ar[Xt]
2 − 2ρV ar[Xt]2
V ar[Xt](2V ar[Xt]2 − 1)
=
−ρ(2V ar[Xt]2 − 1) + V ar[Xt]2
V ar[Xt](2V ar[Xt]2 − 1)
= − ρ
V ar[Xt]
+
V ar[Xt]
2V ar[Xt]2 − 1
Thus the variance and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation are negatively related if
2V ar[Xt]
2 − 1 < 0 ⇔ V ar[Xt] < 1√
2
So, the variance and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation are negatively related under the
assumption that the earnings variance is bounded and the variance is stationary.
In the context of this paper, the Xt are the scaled earnings (Return On Equity).
If |ROE| < 1√
2
then V ar[Xt] < 1√2 . Since the absolute value of ROE mainly
is below 1√
2
≈ 70.5%, it seems reasonable to assume that V ar[Xt] < 1√2 . Thus,
for most of the ﬁrms, the ROE time-series variance is negatively related to the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the ROE.
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E Relation between time-series variance of
unexpected earnings and realized earnings
Let V ar[UX], respectively, V ar[X] denote the time-series variance of unex-
pected earnings, respectively, the time-series variance of realized earnings. Since
V ar[UX] = V ar[X − X̂]
= V ar[X] + V ar[X̂]− 2Corr[X, X̂]
√
V ar[X]
√
V ar[X̂]
=
(√
V ar[X]−
√
V ar[X̂]
)2
+2
√
V ar[X]
√
V ar[X̂]
(
1− Corr[X, X̂]
)
=
⎛⎝1−
√
V ar[X̂]
V ar[X]
⎞⎠2 V ar[X]
+2
√
V ar[X̂]
V ar[X]
(
1− Corr[X, X̂]
)
V ar[X]
where X denotes realized earnings and X̂ denotes the expected value (forecasts)
of earnings. Thus the time-series variance of unexpected earnings (i.e. V ar[UX])
is positively related with the time-series variance of realized earnings. The cor-
relation between the realized value and the forecast value (i.e. Corr[X, X̂]) ex-
presses a form of forecast accuracy. Thus a higher forecast accuracy decreases
the relation between the variance of unexpected earnings (i.e. V ar[UX]) and the
variance of realized earnings (i.e. V ar[X]).
160
F Relation between time-series variance of
unexpected earnings and forecast dispersion
When an individual ﬁrm’s Earnings Response Coefﬁcient (ERC) is estimated, this
is based on time-series data from the current and T previous periods. Let UXt,j
be the unexpected earnings at time t for analyst j. Suppose there are M analysts
and T periods. The mean unexpected earnings at time t over all analysts is
EΩ[UXt] =
1
M
M∑
j=1
UXt,j
Likewise, the mean unexpected earnings for analyst j over the ERC estimation
period is
Eτ [UXj] =
1
T
T∑
u=1
UXt+1−u,j
where Ω denotes the set of analysts and τ the set of time periods. The variances
V arΩ[UXt] and V arτ [UXj] are deﬁned analogously.
The time-series variance of unexpected earnings can also be written as
V ar[UXt] = V arτ [EΩ[UXt]]
=
1
M
(
1
M
M∑
j=1
V arτ [UXj] +
2
M
M∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
Covτ [UXi, UXj]
)
(15)
So the time-series variance of the unexpected earnings is equal to the mean of
the individual analysts’ time-series variances of the unexpected earnings plus two
times the mean of the time-series covariance of unexpected earnings between two
analysts.
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The mean of the individual analysts’ time-series variances of the unexpected earn-
ings can be rewritten as
1
M
M∑
j=1
V arτ [UXj] =
1
M
M∑
j=1
1
T
T∑
u=1
UX2t+1−u,j −
1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
2
=
1
T
T∑
u=1
(
V arΩ[UXt+1−u] + EΩ[UXt+1−u]2
)− 1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
2
=
1
T
T∑
u=1
V arΩ[UXt+1−u]
+
1
T
T∑
u=1
EΩ[UXt+1−u]2 − 1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
2 (16)
So the ﬁrst term in this mean is equal to the mean over time of the variance in the
analyst forecasts. The second term is equal to
1
T
T∑
u=1
EΩ[UXt+1−u]2 = V ar[UXt] +
(
1
T
T∑
u=1
EΩ[UXt+1−u]
)2
= V ar[UXt] +
(
1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
)2
(17)
and the last term equals
1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
2 = V arΩ[Eτ [UXj]] +
(
1
M
M∑
j=1
Eτ [UXj]
)2
(18)
Inserting Equations 17 and 18 into Equation 16 gives
1
M
M∑
j=1
V arτ [UXj]
=
1
T
T∑
u=1
V arΩ[UXt+1−u] + V ar[UXt]− V arΩ[Eτ [UXj]] (19)
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The last term of Equation 19 (V arΩ[Eτ [UXj]]) equals
1
T
(
1
T
T∑
u=1
V arΩ[UXt+1−u] +
2
T
T∑
u=2
u−1∑
s=1
CovΩ[UXt+1−s, UXt+1−u]
)
(20)
Substituting Equation 19 and 20 into Equation 15 and rearranging yields
V ar[UXt] =
1
M − 1
T − 1
T 2
T∑
u=1
V arΩ[UXt+1−u]
+
1
M − 1
2
M
M∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
Covτ [UXi, UXj]
− 1
M − 1
2
T 2
T∑
u=2
u−1∑
s=1
CovΩ[UXt+1−s, UXt+1−u]
Since actual earnings are the same for all analysts, the variance of unexpected
earnings across analysts equals the variance of forecasts across analysts
(i.e. V arΩ[UXt+1−u] = V arΩ[Ft+1−u]), where F denotes the analyst forecast. So
the time-series variance of the unexpected earnings in the ERC is positively re-
lated to the mean over time of the analyst forecast variance. The time-series co-
variance between the unexpected earnings for two analysts is equal to
Covτ [UXi, UXj] = Covτ [X − Fi, X − Fj]
= V arτ [X] + Covτ [Fi, Fj]− Covτ [X,Fi]− Covτ [X,Fj]
where Fj denotes the earnings forecast for analyst j and X denotes realized earn-
ings. So the time-series variance of the unexpected earnings in the ERC is also
positively related to the time-series variance of the actual earnings and the time-
series covariance between the earnings forecasts for two analysts. Likewise, the
covariance between the unexpected earnings for two different points in time but
involving the same analyst equals
CovΩ[UXt+1−s, UXt+1−u] = Covτ [Xt+1−s, Xt+1−u] + Covτ [Ft+1−s, Ft+1−u]
−Covτ [Xt+1−s, Ft+1−u]− Covτ [Xt+1−u, Ft+1−s]
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This implies that the time-series variance of the unexpected earnings in the ERC
is negatively related to the auto-covariance (persistence) in earnings and in the
earnings forecasts.
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G Bias of the parameter estimate and the t-score
when variables are measured with error
Maddala (1992, pp. 451–454) show the bias of a parameter coefﬁcient in a model
where one of the two explanatory variables and the dependent variable are mea-
sured with error. The model from Maddala (1992, pp. 451–454) is
y = β1x1 + β2x2 + e
The observed variables are
Y = y + v X1 = x1 + u X2 = x2
where u, v and e are mutually uncorrelated and also uncorrelated with y, x1 and
x2. Then the regression based on the observable variables is
Y = β1X1 + β2X2 + w
where
w = e+ v − β1u
Then it is shown that
plim β̂1 = β1
(
1− λ
1− ρ
)
plim β̂2 = β2 +
β1λρ
1− ρ2
where λ = V ar[u]V ar[X1] and ρ = Cov[X1, X2]. So for β1 the bias is multiplicative,
whereas for β2 it is additive.
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To make a t-test, one needs to estimate the standard deviation of the parameter
estimate. This is equal to
SE
β̂1
=
1√
n− 2
V ar [e] + V ar [v] + β1
2V ar [u]
V ar [x1] + V ar [u]
SE
β̂2
=
1√
n− 2
V ar [e] + V ar [v] + β1
2V ar [u]
V ar [x2]
Because
tscore =
β̂ − β0
SEβ̂
the t-statistic is also biased. Since V ar[u] is unknown and can not be estimated,
one can not analytically correct either the bias of the estimate or the standard error
of the parameter estimate. As a consequence, the t-statistics and signiﬁcance con-
clusions for the parameters are not appropriate when the variables are measured
with error.
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